

Framework paper on emergence of opposition drivers across sites and shared dialogical interventions



Eleni Andreouli (Open University)

Samarjit Ghosh (Ozyegin Universitesi)

Joana Ricarte (Universidade De Coimbra)

Susan Rottmann (Ozyegin Universitesi)

Harald Weilnböck (Cultures Interactive)

António Leitão (Universidade De Coimbra)

Deliverable D5.1

Framework paper on emergence of opposition drivers across sites and shared dialogical interventions



Co-funded by
the European Union



Innovate
UK

Project name	OppAttune: Countering Oppositional Political Extremism Through Attuned Dialogue: Track, Attune, Limit.
Project acronym	OPPATTUNE
Grant agreement ID	101095170
Deliverable number	D5.1
Deliverable name	Framework paper on emergence of opposition drivers across sites and shared dialogical interventions
Due date	31 May 2024
Submission date	31 May 2024
Type	Framework paper
Dissemination level	Public
Work package	5
Deliverable Leading Partner	Open University
Contributing Partners	Ozyegin Universitesi, Universidade De Coimbra, Cultures Interactive

HISTORY OF CHANGES

Version	Publication date	Changes
1	01.05.2024	WP5 Co-Leads internal review and Quality Assurance
2	09.05.2024	Submitted for Scientific Coordinator internal review and Quality Assurance
3	24.05.2024	Submitted to Scientific Coordinator – final review
4	31.05.2024	OppAttune template formatting, proof-read – Sign Off Scientific & Administrative Coordinator

Views and opinions expressed within this framework paper are those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the Horizon-Europe programme or Innovate UK. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. Grant Agreement No. 101095170.

For more information on this report please contact Eleni Andreouli, eleni.andreouli@open.ac.uk

Follow OppAttune Publications on:






 oppattune.eu  [@oppattune](https://twitter.com/oppattune)  [oppattune](https://www.linkedin.com/company/oppattune)  [@OppAttune](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCOppAttune)  [@oppattune.project](https://www.instagram.com/oppattune.project)

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	6
1. INTRODUCTION.....	7
1.1 WP5 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES.....	7
1.2 AIM AND SCOPE OF FRAMEWORK PAPER	8
1.3 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS	9
2. DRIVERS TOWARDS HOSTILE OPPOSITIONS	12
2.1 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPPOSITION DRIVERS	12
Prejudice and Identity	12
Discourses and Representations	14
2.2 CULTURAL AND MORAL NARRATIVES AS OPPOSITION DRIVERS.....	16
Culture	17
Narratives	19
2.3 SOCIO-POLITICAL OPPOSITION DRIVERS	22
Populism	22
Ontological (in)security	23
Political affect	25
2.4 MATERIAL DRIVERS.....	26
3. CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT OF OPPOSITION DRIVERS.....	29
4. EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT	31
4.1. OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES.....	31
4.2 ISTANBUL, SANLIURFA AND HATAY (TURKEY).....	33
4.3 EAST GERMANY	36
School system and pedagogical deficiencies	36
Quality and availability of community services	37
Transgenerational transmission of anti-democratic and resentful attitudes	38
4.4 CENTRAL PORTUGAL.....	38
(Perceived) corruption	38
Intersecting material and immigration grievances	39
4.4 SUMMARY	40
REFERENCES.....	42

Executive Summary

The present framework paper on the emergence of opposition drivers (D5.1) achieves the following:

Firstly, it provides working definitions for key WP5 and OppAttune concepts (Section 1). In particular, we conceptualise **everyday** extremism as the ‘ordinary’, everyday narratives and practices which (re)produce hostile oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. We further define **opposition drivers** as the psychological, social, political, and material obstacles preventing engagement with ‘other’ perspectives which are (seen as) different from one’s own.

Secondly, the framework paper reviews and integrates selected literature on opposition and polarization from across psychology, sociology, international relations, political science and anthropology. (Section 2).

Thirdly, on the basis of this analysis, the paper develops **a cross-disciplinary conceptual toolkit on the emergence of opposition drivers across interconnected levels of analysis** (Section 3):

- (i) cultural resources, for example, historically rooted and locally grounded cultural narratives about ethnic, religious national groups;
- (ii) social relations, for example, intergroup prejudice;
- (iii) politics and power, for example, populism and nationalist ideologies;
- (iv) context, for example, local and national histories about ‘our’ nation; and
- (iv) lived experience, for example, emotions such as (in)security and (mis)trust.

Fourthly and finally, the paper reports on the **analysis of WP5 ethnographic data from case studies in selected localities in Turkey, Portugal and Germany, with a focus on contentious issues, namely, immigration, intercultural relations and lack of political trust** (Section 4). These analyses provide an empirical illustration of our conceptual toolkit, drawing attention to international patterns as well as local specificities.

1. Introduction

1.1 WP5 Aims and Objectives

WP5, titled ‘Extremism and Living Democracies’, takes an ethnographic approach to everyday extremism by studying common-sense narratives about the ‘other’ across different national and local contexts. Through a detailed understanding of local systems of understanding and practices that support dis/engagement with/from the ‘other’, WP5 aims to identify, understand and support possibilities for dialogue and Attunement. WP5 focuses particularly on immigration, inter-community relations and political mistrust as these have been particularly salient in our fieldwork and they connect with OppAttune’s themes. Our ethnographic approach enables us to map out familiar, routine tropes of common sense and practice *and* to explore ambivalent and oppositional meanings within them. This approach enables us to shed light on the barriers of engaging with others in everyday life as well as the ways through which people bypass these barriers and connect with ‘others’ across difference.

WP5 aims to identify, understand and support possibilities for dialogue in cases of heightened polarisation across selected local ecologies in Turkey, Germany, Portugal, Serbia and Bosnia.

WP5 has the following objectives:

FIGURE 1. WP5 OBJECTIVES



1.2 Aim and Scope of Framework Paper

This paper develops an empirically informed theoretical framework of the emergence of opposition drivers that contribute to everyday extremism in selected local ecologies within and outside of Europe. The paper is the outcome of transdisciplinary collaboration between social scientists, humanities scholars and practitioners from the fields of psychology, anthropology, politics and international relations, and cross-community dialogue. WP5 partners are based in six different institutions internationally, in the UK, Germany, Portugal, Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia.

The aim of the paper is to serve as a theoretical frame for understanding processes of opposition and dialogue in polarising contexts. It offers a conceptual toolkit that brings together insights from initial analyses across WP5 sites in Turkey, Germany and Portugal. The paper serves to guide further fieldwork and the development of local interventions in WP5, ultimately feeding into the overall Attunement Model.

To achieve this aim, the paper reviews and integrates:

- **Theoretical perspectives** and research from psychology, anthropology, political science and related fields
- **Initial ethnographic fieldwork** from local case studies in Turkey, Germany and Portugal, which showcase opposition drivers in contexts of (real and/or imagined) conflict.

Future deliverables of WP5 will build on this framework paper, and on additional fieldwork, to develop local, but transferable, interventions that facilitate dialogue and Attunement. In particular, deliverables will include the production of:

- a. A Good Practice Case Studies Report across the selected sites, which will include examples of social dialogue and democratic resilience that combat polarisation extremism (D5.2).
- b. A Five Country Methods Handbook for the development of dialogical interventions, including an Attuned Social & Dialogue Toolkit (D5.3).
- c. Two Policy Strategy Briefs that translate local people's perspectives, experiences, and knowledge into the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) (D5.4).

1.3 Definition of key terms

Everyday

The domain of the habitual lived experience of day-to-day living – in which “members of a society produce, in the lived world, an understanding of their universe and endow it with meaning” (Pharo, 1985, in Neveu, 2015, p. 90). Our emphasis on the ‘lived’ world aims to highlight the immediacy of local experience as a central feature of the everyday (instead of episodic accounts which emphasize events over the quotidian)¹.

Extremism

Although it lacks a consensual definition (Kinnvall & Capelos, 2021), broadly, PCVE (Preventing and Combating Violent Extremism) literature defines as “extremist,” acts which are visibly disruptive, violent, and threaten the current political order. Extremism is contingent upon the contexts in which it is presented: for an act to be (seen as) extremist, it needs to violate established norms (e.g. forms of xenophobia and racism may not be construed as such in some contexts, e.g. in colonial regimes).

Dialogue

Dialogical engagement with different perspectives whereby the perspective of the ‘other’ is recognised and considered². Engagement with the perspective of the ‘other’ can also be non-dialogical (e.g. violence, oppression of various forms) (Gillespie, 2008; Jovchelovitch, 2007).

Everyday Extremism

The ‘ordinary’, everyday narratives and practices which (re)produce hostile oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Extreme everyday narratives are part of what may be understood as common-sense, manifest, often normalised, in everyday discourse and interaction. What makes such narratives extreme is not their ‘abnormality’, but the fact that they communicate an us/them opposition built upon a requirement for hostility to the other side(s), to the extent of ascribing a lesser value to them, potentially also dehumanising³ them. In dialogical

¹ Whilst the everyday presents itself as unsurprising and predictable, our ethnographic approach challenges the ordinary/extraordinary binary (Totschnig, 2016), by drawing attention to the micro-disruptions that rupture everyday ordinariness.

² An example of dialogue is the “Alliance for Dialogue”, developed by the Budapest Centre, in cooperation with Cultures Interactive. See <https://www.genocideprevention.eu/en/>

³ We understand dehumanisation as a type of cultural violence, following Herbert C Kelman’s definition of the term as “act “of depriving those placed in the category of ‘other’ of dignity by denying their identity and excluding them from one’s own moral community, in other words, from the community with whose members one shares a sense of mutual moral obligation” (2007, p. 41; in Ricarte, 2023, p. 69).

interactions, oppositions in perspectives can be productive for human development and social progress (see Box 1).

Opposition drivers

Psychological, social, political, material obstacles preventing engagement with ‘other’ perspectives which are (seen as) different from one’s own⁴.

Culture

“Common sense” ideas, meanings and morals that are more or less shared and expressed through everyday conversations and narratives. Similar to the concept of social representations and discourses (see 2.1)

Narratives

Social and communicative stories that link events and help people to form coherent understandings of their lives and the world. They reflect and are shaped by cultural meanings, belongings, and worldviews, and as such, narratives are constantly reshaped and co-created.

⁴ Oppositions in perspectives, in and of themselves, can be productive, leading to the construction of new knowledge in order to accommodate diversity within an existing system of understanding. Oppositions can also be non-dialogical, even hostile, leading to the silencing of other perspectives and the domination or destruction of the ‘other’ (see Box 1).

Box 1: Productive oppositions

Unfamiliarity is a constant feature of life across the lifespan and across domains of human activity and experience. Several streams of social and psychological research show that accommodating unfamiliarity (‘otherness’) provides the impetus for change and development, psychologically and socially.

A range of evidence from across psychological research (developmental, organisational psychology, learning theories, social psychology) shows that ‘disruptive’ experiences of the ‘normal’ flow of routine events are opportunities for learning (Gillespie, 2020a). This is because unfamiliarity requires adjustment; it necessitates a change to one’s guiding representation, self-concept, or course of action. This is shown, for example, in Piaget’s (1952) seminal theory of development which shows that cognitive development in children is the result of processes of accommodation in order to incorporate additional environmental complexities and new experiences (e.g. by adjusting existing schemas and categories).

At a broader societal level, differences and/or oppositions across political perspectives are the foundation for social change, progressive or regressive. Political scientists have, for example, argued that the supposedly ‘neutral’ technocratic politics of neoliberal democracies function as a post-political dead-end (Glaser, 2018) and, indeed, as marking the very demise of democracy (Brown, 2019). In contrast, a healthy democracy is built on plurality and the capacity to argue and debate (Mouffe, 2013).

Democratic dialogue depends on citizens’ capacity to navigate oppositional (agonistic) political environments, provided that the realm of agonistic social interaction is equipped with skills and formats of narrative dialogue. Democratic dialogue is thus **the route for combatting and avoiding (antagonistic) hostile polarisation and extremism**.

In the following sections of the paper, we bring together cross-disciplinary evidence and theory to develop a framework that can be used to understand the emergence of hostile opposition drivers that are conducive to everyday extremism.

2. Drivers towards hostile oppositions

2.1 Social psychological opposition drivers

Early research on the psychology of extremism focused on personality traits and attitudes (Kinnvall & Capelos, 2021), drawing on the long tradition of research in the social psychology of prejudice. Accordingly, this section proceeds to outline key social psychological work on prejudice, followed by more critically oriented psychological work on discourses and representations.

Prejudice and Identity

The psychology of **prejudice** has traditionally focused on how people are individually prejudiced because of personality traits or ‘faulty’ cognitive assessments (see Dixon, 2017, for a critical overview). There are three main waves in the psychology of prejudice (Dovidio, 2001). The first wave saw prejudice in terms of personality traits that were considered extreme and uncommon. This wave of research boomed following WWII when psychologists sought to explain the atrocities of the war. A key figure of the time is Adorno, whose notion of the authoritarian personality is still used today (Adorno et al., 1950). Psychological work on personality traits related to prejudice is still widespread, such as research on closed-mindedness (Kruglanski, 2004) and need for cognitive closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001), and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981).

Since the 1970’s, prejudice started to be seen as part of normal cognitive processes, namely categorisation, which leads to error or bias because it simplifies complex information for the purpose of cognitive economy. Gordon Allport, possibly the most seminal figure in the psychology of prejudice, defined it as: “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport 1954, p. 10). Prejudice is understood here as a product of categorisation, a normal and inevitable part of social cognition that helps people make the world intelligible. Prejudice is categorisation which is inaccurate. This tradition of research set the ground for **social identity** theory, developed initially by Henri Tajfel. Scholars in the field have studied the impact of categorisation on identity and intergroup processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), such as ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation (Tajfel, 1970). These studies have led to extensive research into intergroup relations, prejudice and conflict (Reicher, 2004).

A recent critical development in this tradition is Haslam and Reicher’s (2016) identity-based approach to **leadership**. This work is particularly useful for understanding right-wing populism and its appeal. Haslam and Reicher (2016, p.23) defined leadership as “a group process that centers on a psychological bond between leaders and followers grounded in an internalized sense of their common group membership”. The relationship between leaders and followers is crucial. Leadership is not a status of power (though it may become such); it is a process of influence in relationship to followers with whom they share an identity.

Populism (see section 2.3) can be described in these terms: populist leaders construct a sense of common in-group identity with their (potential) followers. They do so by claiming to be ‘one of the people’ and to represent their interests. Importantly, populist leaders, like Donald Trump in the US, Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Giorgia Meloni in Italy, polarise this sense of ‘we-ness’ against ‘others’ who are constructed as the source of people’s problems (Reicher & Haslam, 2016). Donald Trump is, in this sense, an entrepreneur of identity: he portrays himself an ‘ordinary’, prototypical American who can represent the interests of ordinary Americans (Reicher & Haslam, 2016). This identity is constructed as being in direct opposition to the establishment (e.g. the so-called ‘deep state’) in what is called a ‘vertical’ form of populism (people-as-underdog vs. the elite/establishment) (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; see also section 2.3). Similarly, more established politicians are presented as the source of people’s problems (e.g. by allowing ‘mass immigration’). Trump thus is not only represented as ‘one of us’ but also as having the solution to people’s problems (‘Making America Great Again’).

More broadly, ‘challenger parties’, like Chega in Portugal and AfD in Germany (see 3.3 and 3.4 below respectively), act as **political entrepreneurs** (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020). They introduce new elements to the political status quo: they challenge established political parties and import new issues to the political agenda (e.g. ‘culture wars’, EU membership referendum in the UK). Thus, they fragment the political field, disrupt the existing balance of political forces and incite polarisation.

A social identity approach is also useful for understanding everyday extremism as a function of in/out group relations. Notably, Berger (2017) uses this framework to draw a distinction between extremism and violent extremism. He defined the former as “[a] spectrum of beliefs in which an in-group’s success is inseparable from negative acts against an out-group. Negative acts can include verbal attacks and diminishment, discriminatory behaviour, or violence”. Extremism becomes violent when the in-group believes that its success is only possible through violence towards an out-group which is seen as threatening its legitimacy.

In a similar way, the concept of **group focused enmity** suggests that hostility between individuals is not in itself a problematic or even undesirable in principle, but on the contrary, it may be understood as an individual freedom. However, when there is an aspect of devaluation/ denigration of another group on the basis of an ideology of unequal worth of people, group focused enmity may be understood as part of everyday extremism (Zick, Küpper & Mokros, 2023). Considering the notion of everyday extremism against the backdrop of the concept of group-based enmity implies, therefore, a strong focus on the question of whether or not a particular act expresses or implies an unequal personal worth of the other or the group.

On the whole, a social identity perspective suggests that at the core of polarised oppositions lies inter-group antagonism whereby the in-group’s existence relies on the oppression of an ‘othered’ out-group. Populist leaders are crucial in this process. They manipulate existing grievances by constructing the ‘other’ as the source of a problem or crisis and themselves as the true representatives of the in-group’s interests who are able to solve their grievances. As will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, populism:

... typically involves the activity of political agents (movements, parties, leaders, etc.) claiming to express popular interests and to represent associated identities and demands (the true will of the ‘people’) against an establishment, an elite, that undermines them and forestalls their satisfaction. (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Kioupiolis, Nikisianis & Siomos, 2017, p. 4)

In the context of liberal democracies where equality is, at least in principle, a fundamental political value, prejudice often presents itself in indirect and implicit ways. Certainly, prejudice and discrimination are still pervasive and impactful, yet they are often denied and/or presented as reasonable or otherwise acceptable. This is by no means a universal phenomenon, but it shows up particularly in advanced liberal democracies of the Global North. A typical example of this phenomenon in everyday discourse is the ‘I’m not racist, but’ trope, which seeks to inoculate the speaker from accusations of prejudice. This could be, for example in the context of an argument against immigration which may be perceived as prejudiced by other people. In this context, Western-centred psychological research has turned to the study of prejudice as an implicit attitude. This is the third wave in the psychological study of prejudice, according to Dovidio (2001), from the 1990’s onwards. Here, prejudice is theorised in terms of implicit negative attitudes and explicit egalitarian attitudes – a phenomenon which has been called ‘**aversive racism**’ because people have become averse to being considered racist and as such, do not exhibit explicitly racist behaviour (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).

A more critical approach that integrates the macro-level (ideologies, cultural traditions, histories, etc) with the micro-level of everyday ‘mundane’ interactions, is sociological work on **everyday racism**. Following the pioneering work of Essed (1991), who first coined the term, scholars in this field study the everyday familiar practices which, although seen as ‘normal’, are integral in actualising and reinforcing the reality of racism and racialised social relations. In the years that followed Essed’s work, the field of everyday racism has burgeoned (for a critical review, see Bourabain & Verhaeghe, 2021), and has extended to related work on ‘everyday multiculturalism’ and ‘convivial’ co-existence (Harris, 2013; Neal, Bennet, Cochrane & Mohan, 2017; Wise, & Velayutham, 2009).

Discourses and Representations

Critically oriented psychologists have challenged the idea that prejudice is an individual trait or attitude, however implicit or explicit, because it overlooks the role of history, ideology, cultural narratives and power relations. Taking a discourse-based perspective, Billig (1988) has challenged the idea that ‘aversive racism’ is an individual attitude. He has instead argued that it stems from what he calls the widely accepted, common-sense ‘**norm against prejudice**’, because thinking in a way that is prejudiced violates the ideal of impassionate and rational thinking.

The concepts of **discourse** (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and **social representation** (Moscovici, 2008; Sammut, Andreouli, Gaskell & Valsiner, 2015) are useful in theorising the notion of common-sense. Both concepts, stemming from different research traditions, can be broadly understood as systems of common-sense knowledge, which provide

common frames of reference for members of a cultural community, thus enabling them to relate to others and make sense of the world around them. Representations and discourses are collectively constructed by groups and communities, and they are culturally and ideologically rooted in the histories of these groups and communities. They are enacted in the here-and-now of everyday interaction and other practices, which convey meaning. Crucially, discourses and representations are performative. They are themselves forms of action and they have effects (i.e. they are not ‘simply words’, nor are they the reason ‘behind’ people’s behaviours).

Taking a Discourse Historical Approach, Ruth Wodak (2021) focuses particularly on right-wing populism to explore the discursive manifestations of what she calls the ‘politics of fear’. According to Wodak, contemporary right-wing populist leaders construct and advance an image of the ‘other’ as a fearful threat to ‘our’ identity (see ontological (in)security in section 2.3). On this basis, they seek to mobilise disenfranchised citizens, often combining in their populist ideology, elements of nationalism, anti-elitism, authoritarianism, and historical mythologization, to exclude others as a means to protect the nation’s integrity.

The success of populist politics is contingent upon the construction of crises (see Stavrakakis et al., 2017) and, importantly, on the normalisation of the solution that is proposed which, in some cases, can be anti-democratic and authoritarian (Krzyżanowski et al., 2023). A telling example is Hungary’s Victor Orban’s advancement of what he has called ‘illiberal democracy’ (e.g. by restricting the power of the judiciary and civil society). Krzyżanowski and colleagues have advanced a discursive approach to oppositional politics. They argue that crisis has “emerged as a profoundly discursive and narrative construct that legitimises re-definitions of social reality” (Krzyżanowski et al., 2023, p. 423).

Using the theory of social representations, Staerklé, Cavallaro and Cortijos-Bernabeu (2023) take a people-centred approach to populism, as opposed to a leader-centred approach. Staerklé and colleagues theorise populism as a mentality whose core is a shared understanding of intergroup relations as asymmetric, with power concentrated in the hands of an elite minority, at the expense of a powerless majority, the people. This representation stands in dialogical tension with an anti-populist representation, which turns the tables by positioning ‘us’ as reasonable and ‘them’ as ‘ignorant populists’ (see Rovamo & Sakki, 2023)⁵.

Given the multitude of worldviews that circulate within a society, one might expect that people become more open to, or at least tolerant of, different perspectives. Whilst there are many cases of dialogue and engagement across perspectives, that it is also true that people may resist, reject and dismiss alternative perspectives. To explain the social-cognitive mechanisms that operate to prevent dialogue across perspectives, Alex Gillespie (2020a, 2020b) has developed the concept of **semantic barriers**. The starting point of this approach is that engagement with views that (are seen to) differ from our own (e.g. in an ingroup/outgroup situation where difference is pronounced) requires that we step outside the familiar and consider an alternative (see also Box 1). In such cases, people may reflect on or adjust their views, but they may also

⁵ Looking at the bigger picture of political antagonisms at a given time, populist discourse is juxtaposed with anti-populist discourse in a polarised political terrain (Stavrakakis et al., 2017). For example, whilst populist actors seek to gain traction by constructing the source of a crisis in the mainstream elite establishment (e.g. corruption), anti-populist discourse presents the crisis as external to the status quo which it seeks to maintain (e.g. pandemic, migrant influx etc).

resist change, because these views are often taken from granted and are deeply invested (e.g. cultural traditions, religions, etc). In these situations, semantic barriers function to prevent dialogical engagement with a different perspective that is construed as threatening. Semantic barriers are “meanings used to reinforce the semantic boundary between the self’s views and the views of others, thus protecting the self’s universe of meaning from being destabilized (Gillespie, 2020b, p. 22). Importantly, semantic barriers are not individual or personal (like personality traits in some prejudice research, for example). They are socio-cultural resources that are developed over time within specific historical, political and social contexts. For example, climate denialism may be embedded within certain political narratives. Below are some examples of semantic barriers that can hinder cross-cultural dialogue and reinforce hostile us/them oppositions.

TABLE 1. SEMATIC BARRIERS (ADAPTED FROM GILLESPIE, 2020A, 2020B)

Semantic barrier	Examples
Avoiding a different perspective by not acknowledging the motives, beliefs or feelings of the outgroup	Exclusion, dehumanisation of minoritized groups
De-legitimising an ‘other’ perspective to such an extent that it can be dismissed	Devaluation, stigma against minoritized groups
Limiting the impact of an alternative perspective on one’s own perspective	Rationalisation and other discursive tropes used in everyday communication, such as the “I’m not prejudiced but...” which serve to inoculate ‘othering’ narratives from accusations of prejudice

In closing this section, it is important to note that multiple factors, including the broader context and its power dynamics, play a crucial role on the trajectory of intergroup relations (as the different sections of this paper show). There are situations where semantic facilitators take precedence over barriers. This is precisely what the interventions of WP5 (D5.3) intend to achieve – that is, using empirical evidence from case studies across Europe to develop dialogical interventions to resist polarisation (Objective 3).

2.2 Cultural and moral narratives as opposition drivers

In this section, we focus on cultural and moral opposition drivers and in particular draw on the discipline of anthropology and anthropological approaches to narratives for our discussion. Within the broader framework of the paper, anthropological work aligns well with issues identified by psychologists and political scientists for understanding hostile oppositions, such as dehumanization, normalization and security. But, anthropology pays special attention to

culture, history, moral norms, and daily social interactions in local communities and shows how these structure everyday extremism.

Culture

Although anthropological work on opposition drivers centres on the role of culture, and despite (or perhaps because of) the importance of studying culture in this discipline, anthropologists have never been able to agree upon a definition. A classic work in the 1950s identified more than 164 definitions (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). A current basic definition can be found in introductory undergraduate anthropology textbooks. For example: culture is “a set of beliefs, practices, and symbols that are learned and shared. Together, they form an all-encompassing, integrated whole that binds people together and shapes their worldview and lifeways” (Nelson & Braff 2020). Anthropologists like Richard Schweder (1991) have sought to connect anthropological definitions of culture with cultural psychology, writing that “cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion” (p.73). The meaning-making function of culture and cultural diversity are a central theme for both (see also section 2.1 on discourse and social representations above, for an alternative, but similar, theorisation of cultural knowledge or common-sense). Like anthropologists, cultural psychologists in this tradition see any behaviour and emotion as culturally conditioned.

Some anthropologists object to any standardized definition of culture, arguing that culture cannot be reduced to any shared set of values. They argue that within any culture there are many sub-groups or sub-cultures and even within these smaller units there may be multiple interpretations of experiences and conflicts over norms. Thus, recent years have even seen some fully rejecting the culture concept for being entirely too static and essentialist (Fox & Ling, 2002). Even if they go along with a broad concept of culture, most anthropologists are reluctant to create cultural typologies like some cross-cultural psychologists and criminologists. For example, the latter have suggested links between terrorism and cultural dimensions like “fatalism, tight-ness, collectivism, gender egalitarianism, and power distance” (Gelfand et al., 2013, 503). To many anthropologists and cultural psychologists, these approaches to culture are likely to seem like vast over-simplifications and too rigid as well as prone to misuse by political actors. Yet, jettisoning any idea of culture along with cultural typologies risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater, so-to-speak.

Box 2: Culture

In this paper, we propose an intermediate approach that recognizes that **culture is made in everyday narratives and is reproduced from myriad and changing perspectives.**

Culture is unstable, but it is still possible to talk about meanings and morals that are more or less shared, if also contested. Most importantly, we see culture as something that is lived by individuals and groups. i.e. it includes psychological processes of individual coping, personal development and conflict management along the challenges of life course and societal transformation; as such, cultures are inherently ambivalent in that they may be more or less sustainable modes of organizing power and freedom.

Culture is often overlooked in research on political ideology or in the organizing of extremist movements, but it deserves sustained attention because it matters to those involved in extremist movements. “From the outside, extremist right-wing movements appear to coalesce around ideas and ideologies, but internalist studies show that... music, clothing, style, bodily disciplines, ritual, identity, and performance are critical for recruiting new members and solidifying the commitment of participants in far-right groups” (Blee, 2007). The importance of political messaging may be overrated. Research shows that “people are drawn to far-right movements for a variety of reasons that have little connection to political ideology (Blee, 2002) – including a search for community, affirmation of masculinity, and personal loyalties” (Blee 2007). Everyday bonds such as friendship, family and loyalty give meaning to extremist belongings (Atran, 2011; Pilkington et al., 2010; Pilkington, 2014).

A culture-sensitive approach also helps to explain the circulation of contradictory narratives in local settings. For example, a recent ethnography based in Sweden shows how villagers are enamoured of the Swedish national myth of being morally exceptional for promoting values such as humanitarianism and equality (McClusky, 2019). At the same time, they critique refugee reception and seek to restrict immigration in their own village. Using Scott’s (1990) concepts of hidden and public transcripts, an anthropological approach to culture explains the contradictory perceptions of being “good,” “decent,” and “righteous Swedes” while expressing anti-immigrant sentiment (McClusky, 2019). A close look at culture often reveals a wide array of such seeming contradictions.

OppAttune research can tease out how people perceive of themselves as ethically and morally “good” while also promoting oppositional narratives. Through in-depth ethnographic work, we aim to show how morality and culture are interlinked with hostile othering and made “normal” in particular localities.

Narratives

One way of thinking about culture is as the “common sense” ideas that are expressed through everyday conversations and narratives. Within our developing theoretical framework for understanding oppositional drivers within living democracy - we regard culture as common-sense as an additional dimension alongside discourses and social representations discussed in 2.1 above.

Within anthropology and beyond, an important approach to studying culture has been via the narratives that reflect cultural meanings, belongings, worldviews and processes of individual coping in social settings (Bruner, 1986; 1990; Ochs & Capps, 1996; Ricoeur, 2004). Anthropologists have been interested in narratives since the discipline’s founding (Boas, 1914; Malinowski, 1961[1922]), however narrative became a central way of understanding culture for anthropologists when the “narrative turn” swept through the social sciences in the 1980s. Narratives are social and communicative stories that are continuously re-shaped and even co-created when they are shared. Narratives link events sequentially meaning that they can be treated as the systems of stories “that relate to one another with coherent themes forming a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts” (Halverson et al., 2011, p. 1).

Narratives are among the most available expressions of a given culture’s values, schemas and scripts. Humans live in and through narratives – they shape our perceptions of ourselves and our reality (Bruner, 1986, 1990; Somers & Gibson, 1993; Ochs & Capps, 1996).

By meaningfully linking past and present experience in cultural frames and reflecting on these with others, we create personal and group identities. Narratives also orient individuals to future aspirations, hopes and dreams. In sum, for anthropologists, narratives are critical models of and for culture. Thus, the study of everyday narratives allows us to understand the perceptions and experiences of individuals and groups propagating and confronting everyday extremism.

**There is literally
no social world
and even no self
without narratives
to express, explain
and navigate it.**

What is narrated has a specific purpose for the teller and listener meaning that a key to interpreting narrative is understanding its function, its structure and how its parts are “are linked temporally and causatively” (Bradby, 2017: 206). In this way, narratives are self-reinforcing semantic systems with barriers intended to protect the coherence of the self. Narratives are, however, dynamic systems of understanding and engaging with the social world, and as such, they are open to change.

The circumstance is important for shaping the perception of the narrative, including “the participation framework, the composition of the audience, and the context of the telling” (Gotsch & Palmberger, 2022). In OppAttune WP5, we focus on narratives within ordinary speech and everyday interactions that contain a requirement for hostility, even dehumanisation, to the other side(s). Anthropologists have shown that narrative provides “ethical and moral directions and religious or political explanations of what holds the world together” (Gotsch & Palmberger, 2022). But, more anthropological research is needed on narratives that imply a

requirement for hostility and devaluation – why are they meaningful? Where, when and how do they emerge? How are they received, welcomed or combatted?

Box 3: 3N Framework and ethnographic research

Psychologists have a useful theoretical framework for tracing the emergence of extremist thinking from a motivational imbalance where a given need overrides other basic concerns (Kruglanski & Szumowska, 2021) or more specifically, when one particular narrative is over-valued compared to others. This motivational imbalance or need for significance has been described as the **significance-quest theory (SQT) or the 3N Framework**. This framework is based on three fundamental premises:

- a) the dominant need underlying extremism is a desire for significance;
- b) this need is linked to action by an ideological narrative that justifies extreme means for achieving group goals; and
- c) a social network to support and spread the narrative is important.

Thus far, the 3N Framework has only been used in quantitative studies of violent extremism, so OppAttune is among the first to look at the relationship among needs, narratives and networks in everyday extremism from a qualitative point of view.

Research on extremism in Europe has identified some common need-based narratives of extremist thinking, such as: the struggle for identity narrative, the masculinity narrative, the victimhood narrative, the loss of self-government narrative, and the eco-fascist narrative (RAN, 2020). In OppAttune’s work, anthropological research on the everyday will further reveal and specify the unmet needs and the explanatory socio-cultural narratives that accompany them. Further, it can show how narrative tellings are circulating in local networks, when they are told and how tellers may re-shape narratives for particular purposes.

Ethnographic research on the everyday is inherently attentive to narrative, which is the active force shaping everyday experience (Fischer-Nebmaier, 2015). “Narrative pervades virtually every ethnographic field experience and forms part and parcel of and is represented in all written ethnography” (Gotsch & Palmberger, 2022). An important goal of ethnography is to trace how narrative circulates in cultural groups, communities or across networks (e.g. media, families, neighbourhood gossip) and to examine how networks based on emotional connection shape narratives/actions and group identities. Narratives have real consequences. Thus, it is quite useful to examine the narratives that foster moral disengagement and extremist thinking. For example, ethnographic work can identify narratives that de-humanize, harmful acts that are labelled euphemistically, displacement or diffusion of responsibility and a sense of moral justification (Bandura, 1986, 2002, 2015).

Although narratives have collective and individual functions and purposes, their success is not a foregone conclusion – there can be incoherence – narratives that don’t quite make sense in a particular space or time. We cannot assume that narratives will be understandable to all members of a community. Ethnographic fieldwork has to reveal what is understood, when and

how and what this means in the broader context of people's lives as well as what seems unintelligible, meaningless or irrelevant.

This touches upon the second main aspect of OppAttune's mission: to develop "evidence-based innovations" e.g. tools, methods, approaches to practice, that impact social life - understood as an emergent, contextual and communicative phenomenon - by promoting "social dialogue" and "lived democracy interventions". Here OppAttune's key term "narration/narrative communication" (complementary to "narrative" becomes relevant. Since narration is understood as the expression of subjective accounts by people (live narrators) to others (co-narrative listeners) about individual experiences they have personally lived through – it may also include narrative accounts of lived situations of being personally demeaned, humiliated, devalued or even dehumanized, as happens, for example, in racial insults or other forms of group-focused resentment, hatred or harm; and narration may also include narratives of inflicting such harm, as perpetrators may provide if properly facilitated. Given the basic narratological finding that telling/narrating such experiences supports processes of re-living and self-reflective working-through of these experiences and can induce personal growth and development, so that future resilience and behaviour follows less destructive and more dialogic and pro-social pathways (Schafer 1980; Köttig 2013, Köttig & Blum 2018).

Ethnographic fieldwork has to reveal what is understood by these narratives, especially those that include acts of devaluing and dehumanising others, when and how and what they mean in the broader context of people's lives as well as what seems unintelligible, meaningless or irrelevant. At the same time, fieldwork intends to develop interventions that are able to defuse social tendencies of dehumanising others and enhance "social dialogue" and "lived democracy" experiences.

Box 4: Key points about narratives

Narratives and Identity: Narratives shape perceptions of self and reality, linking past and present experiences to create personal and group identities, and orienting individuals to future aspirations.

Dynamism of Narratives: Narratives are dynamic meaning systems that are open to change, though they often act as self-reinforcing semantic systems.

Ethics and Morality in Narratives: Narratives provide ethical, moral, religious, or political explanations for social life. More research is needed on the significance, emergence, and reception of narratives implying hostility and devaluation of "others."

Typical Meaning of Narrative in Extremism and Prevention Literature: "Narrative" is usually used metaphorically to refer to a particular worldview or ideology that also includes basic claims about history, as in the "right-wing extremist narrative" or the "Islamist narrative" implying certain assumptions about how e.g. the history of the German nation or the history of Islam and states with Muslim populations has unfolded and what this means for the geopolitical present of nations and groups of population.

Narrative Focus with in OppAttune (WP5): We focus on narratives in ordinary speech and interactions that require hostility to others.

2.3 Socio-political opposition drivers

Having considered key work from social psychology and anthropology shedding light on the emergence of opposition drivers, we now turn to relevant work from political science (predominantly, but also political philosophy, political psychology and international relations). Here we draw attention to the important role played by political projects and ideology (namely, populism which relies on us/them polarity) and affect, with a focus on (in)security and resentment which have been shown to be significant drivers of us/them hostile oppositions.

Populism

The most widely used and accepted definition of populism among scholars in the field comes from Mudde (2004). Mudde defines populism as a ‘thin ideology’ meaning that it has not a definite content but that it depends on the specific political context in which it is developed. For Mudde (2004, p. 543):

Populism is a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.

Populism can take different forms. Its distinguishing feature is the categorical, clear-cut distinction between the **‘people’ against an ‘other’**. The way that these categories are concretised depends on the particular political project that is mobilised and the broader historical, cultural, political context in which it is located. A commonly made distinction is between right-wing and left-wing populism. Right-wing populism is most often linked with nationalism because defines the ‘people’ exclusively (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), as a bounded, naturalised category whose essence and rightful entitlements are under threat by external groups (e.g. by migrants). This is the case in populism’s recent European manifestations in European politics, with the rise of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric and political parties in national and European parliaments. This may be described as a horizontal type of populism because, at its core, there is an in/out distinction between ‘us’ (the people as nation) and ‘them’ (non-members such as migrants and refugees). On the other hand, left-wing populism, but not only, tends to define the people more inclusively (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013) in political or economic terms, for example, as the 99% which is opposed to the so-called 1%, as was seen in the anti-globalisation movements of the early 2000’s and later. As noted above (section 2.1), this is a vertical type of populism with the ‘people’ being juxtaposed to elites and/or the establishment.

Populism can be helpfully understood as a discursive construction rather than a political ideology (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; see also 2.1 above). De Cleen and Stavrakakis provide the following definition of populism:

Populism is a dichotomic discourse in which “the people” are juxtaposed to “the elite” along the lines of a down/up antagonism in which “the people” is discursively

constructed as a large powerless group through opposition to “the elite” conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful group. Populist politics thus claim to represent “the people” against an “elite” that frustrates their legitimate demands, and presents these demands as expressions of the will of “the people”. (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017, p.310)

Thus, populism, both vertical and horizontal, is shaped by the identities it constructs. In this sense, populism is performative (Laclau, 2005): it is constituted through the very act of constructing a people, deprived of its rightful power or entitlements, against an ‘other’, be that a powerful elite that undermines people’s power (e.g. through corruption, vested interests etc) or undeserving ‘outsiders’ who take up resources.

Importantly, populism emerges in moments of **crisis** (Moffit, 2015). To be clear, and following Moffit’s (2015) convincing account, crisis is not an objective reality that triggers populist responses. Rather, it is an internal feature of populism. Populist actors construct a sense of crisis (e.g. refugee crisis, economic crisis etc) which polarises the political terrain between people and a dangerous other (who is the source of the crisis), thus necessitating strong leadership, in the form of populist leaders, that can solve the crisis. A key point to note is that whilst the crisis is performed through populist discourse, failures in the system (e.g. lowering of living standards) are very much real in people’s lives. In a similar manner Brubaker (2017), defines populism as a discursive and stylistic repertoire which serves as a symbolic resource that may be drawn upon by political actors under conditions that are conducive to it (e.g. financial crash, distrust in institutions).

Ontological (in)security

The construction of crises relies on a sense of threat and danger for a discourse, through a speech act (Habermas, 1984; 1987), to be transformed into perceived reality. Framing any subject in terms of crisis has proven to be a powerful construct to mobilize feelings of anxiety and fear, leading to the search for protection within one’s own in-group and contributing to the development of hostile opposition and everyday extremism. The notion of crisis creates a sense of instability and exceptionalism, rupturing with what is considered to be stable and continuous, and appealing to feelings of insecurity about the present and, most importantly, the future. This is why the notion of insecurity is mobilized by populist actors, creating a sense of urgency and action through a process known as **securitization** (Fierke, 2007). Put differently, threats are not just threats by nature, rather they are constructed as such through language. Being in this process is imminently based on binaries like ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, because it appeals to the very existence of an individual or social group, leading to feelings of ontological anxiety.

The term ontological security derives from this and refers to “a person’s fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a basic *trust of other people*, [which is] necessary in order for a person to maintain a sense of psychological well-being and avoid **existential anxiety**” (Giddens, 1991, p. 37). Theorists of ontological security usually ground their analyses in an ontology of the individual subject, albeit one inherently intertwined in social relations, underscoring the significance of biographical continuity in fulfilling the identity needs of the

subject – a consistent self-narrative that, nonetheless, remains vulnerable (Laing, 1960; Giddens, 1991). The notion of ontological security highlights the pivotal role of the containment of existential anxieties to engage in ‘normal’ everyday activities through routine behaviour and a fundamental sense of trust. In times of uncertainty – either real or imagined/constructed – existing stereotypes and prejudice based on racism, social exclusion and economic inequalities, among others, can be mobilized by radical political actors to attribute responsibility and assign some sort of blame for the situation, creating an exogenous rationality which is grounded into mistrust, exclusion and polarization.

According to the political psychologist Catarina Kinnvall, these narratives are reinforced through a dichotomous logic of self/other: securitized identities invariably rely on the portrayal of an essentialized 'stranger-other' figure to bolster 'a singular and harmonious identity of the "self"' (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 36). However, the securitization of subjectivity extends beyond confrontational self/other identity politics; it involves 'turning the other into an abject as the unwanted (essentialized) part of the self is projected onto the other' (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 47). In this psychological and unconscious process of othering, the abject remains a part of the self, and since it has been previously repressed, it often resurfaces as strangely familiar. Despite the self's lack of recognition of these dynamics, there is a fear that the abject will reclaim its former place. Consequently, the self resorts to differentiating practices such as racial prejudice and dehumanization to continuously distance itself from the abject-other it has constructed. In this process of abjection, the other transitions from the figure of a stranger to that of an enemy, which Kinnvall interprets as 'an attempt to securitize subjectivity in times of uncertainty' (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 56).

The everyday is considered by many scholars to be the main site in which these securitization processes take place, promoting the construction of identities based on the notion of the ‘other’ as a threat through a process known as the politics of ‘othering’ (Croft, 2012, p. 223). In response and in the face of structural changes, individuals seek to 'securitize subjectivity' – to reinforce what they perceive as a threatened self-identity. In this context, religious and nationalist narratives offer significant resources for this pursuit of ontological security-seeking behaviour (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 4).

As everyday extremism refers to the normalization and reproduction of hostile oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see section 1.3), ontological insecurity is a concept that can be useful to understand the emergence of feelings of insecurity or marginalization. Unlike organized forms of extremism, everyday extremism operates at the grassroots level, manifesting in subtle forms of intolerance and radicalization within communities. **Therefore, the connection between ontological security and everyday extremism lies in the human need for identity and belonging.**

Individuals or communities experiencing ontological insecurity may seek refuge in extremist ideologies promising a sense of purpose and solidarity (Berger, 2017). Extremist narratives often exploit these insecurities, framing certain groups as existential threats, thereby exacerbating tensions and fueling radicalization. Societal-level erosion of ontological security further normalizes extremist discourse, as trust in institutions wanes and social cohesion weakens. This creates fertile ground for extremist ideologies to gain traction, perpetuating cycles of conflict and radicalization.

Political affect

In WP5, we treat the affective dimension of experience, emotions, as social *and* psychological, rather than in terms of inner individual feelings. Whilst here we draw principally on social and political psychology, it should be noted that the ‘sociality’ emotions has been theorised by scholars across psychology and related fields (e.g. in psychoanalytic research; see Cropp, 2017).

Emotions are subjectively felt, at a personal level, but also jointly experienced in group settings where collective identities and senses belonging are brought to the foreground within a common project. **Collective emotions** “are the result of acting and feeling together as a group” (Sullivan, 2015, p. 383). Collective emotions therefore require some kind of concerted joint action with others. It not enough to experience the same feeling as other people; what makes emotions collective is their inherent relationality and the fact that they are entangled with cultural meaning making and embedded in social contexts (Wetherell, 2015).

As Kinnvall and Capelos (2021, p.2) have noted, collective emotions are ‘patterns of relationships’. As such, they involve what we may call ‘the self’ (an individual person or a collective, a group, depending on the context) and an ‘other’ towards whom emotions are directed or invested into. Emotions are also attached to socially constructed representations, which take the form of collective memories and identities, ideologies and narratives. Introducing an action orientation to this understanding of emotions, we also suggest that emotions are attached to collective projects which can be backward-looking (e.g. nostalgia towards the national past – see Gilroy, 2004), future oriented (e.g. indignation and/or hope tied to collective action towards change), exclusionary (e.g. group-based enmity as discussed in 2.1) or inclusionary (e.g. care, solidarity, as in some community work during Covid-19, for example).

Tereza Capelos and Nicolas Demertzis (2018, 2022) have developed a theoretical framework of political affectivity, which draws on political psychology and sociology. Their approach takes as starting point the increased popularity of far-right populism, nationalism, and other ‘extreme’ political orientations in the current political conjuncture, particularly in liberal democracies of the Global North following the global financial crisis. Their elaboration addresses a notable gap in populism literature which has largely failed to articulate the impact of affectivity in these politics. Their focus is on **resentment**, people’s sense of moral anger against felt injustice, which they describe as “the emotional energy that breaks the mold of political inertia” (p.412). Resentment mobilises people to engage in political action (e.g. demonstrations, strikes, but also direct action). The concept of **I-GAP**, developed through the Horizon 2020 D.RAD project (DeRadicalisation in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Reintegrate) is helpful here. I-GAP refers to the spectrum of injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation which is used to explain processes of radicalisation especially among young people in urban areas. The affective charge of contemporary politics is obvious, for example, in the political tensions that accompanied events such as Brexit in the UK, the debt crisis in Greece, and the electoral win, and defeat, of Donald Trump in the US presidency. This situation is strikingly different from the relative stability and political ‘dullness’ of the ‘long 90s’ (Gilbert, 2015) that came to an end with 2008-09 crisis.

Taking the case of the Greek ‘economic crisis’, Capelos and Demertzis (2018) show that resentment, as moral anger against felt injustice, is experienced when citizens have a high sense of political efficacy, that is, they feel they are able to have a political impact through their action. Resentment is thus associated with political action. On the other hand, *ressentiment* a more complex emotion referring to (psychoanalytically speaking) repressed indignation, and it builds up when citizens feel disempowered/powerless to act. Ressentiment describes the affective dimension of ‘grievance politics’ which emerges when citizens feel victimised, even humiliated, and unable to change their circumstances in the face of crises, such as the financial crisis, the ensuing austerity and the harsh implications for people’s livelihoods (Capelos & Demertzis, 2022). Ressentiment mobilises reactionary, past-oriented political narratives (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018) amongst those who feel most powerless, victimised and weak. There is a core of bitterness attached to this sense of powerlessness (Capelos & Demertzis, 2022). Further work in this research programme on the emotional mechanisms of anti and pro-democratic grievance politics is currently being supported by EU Horizon through the [Politics of Grievance and Democratic Governance \(PLEDGE\)](#) project.

Grievance politics create fertile ground for populism across Europe and elsewhere. Following the global financial crisis, such grievances have commonly been narrated in terms of ‘the left behind’ or the ‘losers of globalisation’ who are represented as the ‘real’ people against the elites. Political leaders, such as Marine Le Pen in France, Björn Höcke in Germany, and many others across Europe and beyond, build their politics on the manipulation of such feelings of discontent. As well as being ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ (see 2.1), they also engage in ‘emotional governance’ (Kinnvall & Capelos, 2021) seeking to mobilise resentment into oppositional ‘anti-politics’ against ‘others’, such as minorities and what is construed as the political, economic, cultural establishment. In a similar vein, far-right nationalist leaders discursively combine elements of nationalism, anti-elitism, authoritarianism, and historical mythologization in their discourse in order to nurture and mobilise a ‘politics of fear’ against migrants and other minorities who are portrayed as violating and threatening the national ‘we’ (Wodak, 2021).

Grievance politics are leader-centred (not party centred) and, instead of policies, they offer symbolic representation to the people they (claim to) speak on behalf of (Flinders & Hinterleitner, 2022). As such, they are characterised by a distinctive performative style that foregrounds the leaders’ identity as ‘one of the people’ and assigns blame to those construed as responsible for the plight of the people (e.g. migrants, the ‘deep state’, Brussels bureaucrats and so on). Hence, considering the role of affect is crucial for understanding populist leadership and populism as a form of polarising politics more broadly.

2.4 Material drivers

Following on from the discussion of political affect in relation to populism, we consider material conditions as an important opposition driver that links together the symbolic, affective and structural. Materiality is understood here as the way the physical, material world interacts with social and cultural domains. Against dichotomous perspectives that assume that either the material or the discursive/ideological domains determine one another, we consider their interaction (Dant, 2006, p. 290; Schouten & Mayer, 2017 p. 309). Material conditions, especially by shaping social relations of production, have an undeniable impact on the way

societies are organized (Marx & Engels, 1848, p. 29-30), whilst ideas, practices and discourses provide the means through which one makes sense of the material world (Campbell, 2013, p. 236-7). Furthermore, materiality can be seen as the interplay between the material and its structural conditions *par rapport* to ideology and identities. This notion highlights the importance of articulating political economy to extremism, connected to people's life conditions.

Together with group grievances, whether of nationalistic, classicist or more broadly between 'haves/have-nots', material drivers act as triggers of hostile oppositions and everyday extremism. They intertwine with other socio-political drivers, such as populism, ontological (in)security and political affect, providing a very *real*, physical presence or confirmation to political disillusionment, impending feelings of threat, both to one's livelihood and ways-of-living/culture, as well as feelings of hopelessness, victimhood and resentment. Socio-economic marginalization, for example, can be seen as a source of ontological insecurity, as well as an outcome of the socio-economic and political changes resulting from globalization, which lead to heightened levels of anxiety in people's everyday lives (Giddens, 1991, p. 37). Real and perceived socio-economic inequalities can also turn into a form of self-identification and othering that feeds prejudice, polarization and exclusion. Whilst several studies have disputed the direct relationship between inequalities and radicalisation, drawing on traditional approaches to violent extremism and quantitative data (Vidra & Zeller, 2020; Franc & Pavlović, 2023), preliminary WP5 fieldwork findings (see section 4.4 below) show that it is in the realm of everyday experiences, discourses and narratives that socio-economic marginalization appears as a driver towards the development of hostile oppositions.

Inequality, economic crises and market failures can fuel a sense of abandonment that is frequently instrumentalized in populist rhetoric. While this is not a novel trend, having been studied by 'demand side' theories with the idea of 'losers of globalisation' or the 'left-behinds' (Inglehart & Norris, 2016), the current context of intertwined 'permacrises' (e.g., economic, migratory, political, pandemic, environmental, war-related, and so on) of the past fifteen years has exacerbated this phenomenon. The polarizing us/them strategy of populist anti-corruption rhetoric is grounded in the notion of material loss due to injustice or political incompetence which populist parties promise to address (see also the discussion of Populism in the beginning of this section). As a matter of illustration, the Portuguese far-right political party Chega's slogan during the 2024 national legislative elections was "*Let's clean Portugal against corruption*", making reference to a perceived lack of meritocracy in awarding civil service and public administration jobs (i.e. through personal connections – *tachos* - instead of merit).

Moreover, inflation, housing prices, limited access to and poor health and public services are all major material grievances mobilized by extremist rhetoric. This is expressed in terms of discourses such as **the interests of governing elites against the needs of the people** or those who contribute against those that live off the labour of others. Material grievances can also be associated with migration, mobilizing both a sense of lost or stolen opportunities and jobs, but also in the way migrants might be seen to 'crowd-out' access to public services, including health and education, or to be driving house prices up. Resentment towards migrants or refugees can also be manifest in tropes, untruths and conspiracy theories about how the government prioritises foreigners while disregarding nationals. This exclusionary logic couples real and perceived material needs with existing anti-immigration narratives and prejudice to

explain why economic conditions keep getting worse. This takes place even when national statistics demonstrate that migrants are net contributors to the state, especially in relation to its social security system.

Welfare chauvinism is a useful term for understanding this phenomenon. Welfare chauvinism can be defined as “the view that the benefits of the welfare state should primarily be given to the native population, and not shared with the immigrant populations” (Bell et al., 2023, p. 301). The term was originally coined in the context of structural changes and new cleavages of the 1990s to explain the positions of right-wing nationalistic political parties (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990). It has more recently been used to study attitudes in the context of what some have called ‘selective solidarity’ (Careja & Harris, 2022). A flourishing scholarship on welfare chauvinism has since then identified several factors influencing these attitudes in Europe, ranging from social inequalities to subjective feelings of economic security. The latter have been shown to play a more important role, than a person’s actual economic situation, in explaining welfare chauvinistic attitudes (Kros & Coenders, 2019). A study conducted by the social workers and political scientists David Andreas Bell, Marko Valenta and Zan Strabac has also found that, more than objective measures of a society’s economic situation, welfare chauvinistic attitudes in Europe are driven by subjective perceptions of the macro-economic context, which are intensified by the strength of far-right populism in a given country.

The weaponization of welfare chauvinism by the populist far-right in electoral campaign discourses throughout Europe points to the importance of addressing the relationship between materiality and the rise of hostile opposition narratives and behaviours, through a consideration of the **political economy of everyday extremism**. For example, welfare chauvinism has been widely recognized as having played a major role in the Brexit referendum, being associated with current anti-immigration rhetoric in the UK and in Europe more broadly (D’Angelo, 2023). This concept has also been used to explain attitudes towards social justice and welfare deservingness in Europe in the context of perceived never-ending crises (Attewell, 2020; Cruz Santos et al., 2022) and the relationship between economic grievances and radical right electoral results (Abou-Chadi et al., 2021). As will be shown in section 3.4 below, this framework provides a convincing interpretation of the successful mobilization of anti-immigration rhetoric in Portugal.

In conclusion, although material conditions play an undeniable role in how extremism grows, it is materiality, i.e. the **interaction between the physical and the social**, that can account for *how* these processes take place. Material elements feed extremist and populist discourses not simply because individuals and groups have basic needs that must be met, but also in broader structural ways, including relations of production. However, material conditions transcend structural dimensions, having also an important impact on the symbolic realm insofar as people’s *perceptions* of macro-economic conditions are successfully mobilized in far-right populist discourses. Material conditions are also a source of self-identification and othering, impacting in-group and out-group relations and shaping attitudes and behaviours. In addition to the initial analyses presented in this framework paper (especially in the Portuguese and German case studies), WP5 will explore material drivers of hostile oppositions in more detail in the following phases of fieldwork and analysis.

3. Conceptual toolkit of opposition drivers

The aim of this framework paper is to serve as a conceptual frame for understanding processes of opposition and dialogue in polarising contexts. As noted in the paper's introduction, it achieves this aim through the development of a conceptual toolkit for identifying opposition drivers in local contexts and patterns across different local ecologies. The paper will guide further fieldwork and the development of local interventions in WP5, ultimately feeding into OppAttune's Attunement Model.

The previous sections of this paper have reviewed key theoretical perspectives and research traditions from psychology, anthropology, political science and related fields, which, from their different disciplinary perspectives, shed light on the development and functions of hostile oppositions and everyday extremism.

To recap, we conceptualise everyday extremism as the 'ordinary', everyday narratives and practices which (re)produce hostile oppositions between 'us' and 'them'. Importantly, we draw a distinction between, on the one hand, oppositional thinking and argumentation, which is fundamental for human development, social change and healthy democratic debate (see Box 1) and, on the other hand, hostile oppositional discourses and practices which (re)produce 'othering' (in the form of devaluation, even dehumanisation) and promote or enact violence.

In our selective review of cross-disciplinary literature, we have sought to identify key drivers for the emergence of (hostile) oppositions. We refer to those as opposition drivers, defined as the psychological, social, political, material obstacles preventing engagement with 'other' perspectives which are (seen as) different from one's own. Our analysis chimes with the most recent [World Values Survey \(2024\)](#) which concludes that "[p]olarisation needs to be defined as a multidimensional problem, made up of several (often competing) differences in values, attitudes and beliefs".

We have considered scholarly work that contributes to our understanding of opposition drivers at different levels: social-psychological (e.g. prejudice, social identity processes), cultural (narratives), socio-political (e.g. political affect, populism) and material (e.g. regional inequalities, deficiencies in state provision).

Here we bring together these theoretical and empirical observations to propose an intersectional cross-disciplinary framework that integrates psychological, social, cultural, political and material drivers of hostile oppositions. Box 2 below defines the five interconnected levels of analysis that structure our proposed framework.

Box 5: Levels of analysis of opposition drivers

- 1. Cultural resources** – *socially constructed symbolic resources that are concretized in common-sense and everyday practice*
- 2. Social relations** – *social psychological processes involved in forming connections and relating to, or distancing from, others on the basis of group membership*
- 3. Politics & Power** – *actions associated with the institution, governance and distribution of (symbolic/cultural, structural and/or direct) power within/across communities*
- 4. Context** – *particularities of the temporal, spatial and material context within which oppositions operate*
- 5. Lived experience** – *the ‘felt’ everyday reality of engaging with/distancing from others*

Using this analytic structure, Table 2 below presents our proposed conceptual toolkit for studying opposition drivers in terms along these five levels of analysis:

TABLE 2. CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT OF OPPOSITION DRIVERS

Levels of analysis	Cross-disciplinary conceptual tools		
Cultural resources	Narratives (e.g. against historical ‘others’)	Social representations and semantic barriers (e.g. silencing other perspectives)	Discourse and communication (e.g. rhetoric of crisis, welfare chauvinist tropes)
Social relations	In/Out-group identities (e.g. national, local, ethnic)	Intra-group processes (e.g. leadership/followership)	Inter-group processes (e.g. prejudice, group-focused enmity)
Politics and Power	Political projects and counter-projects (e.g. populism)	Ideologies (e.g. nativism, nationalism)	Political leaders
Context	History (personal/familial, local, national, international)	Local culture and ecology Family environments and personal relations	Structures, institutions, material realities
Lived experience	Affectivity (e.g. political resentment)	Familiarity, habit Sense of threat, crisis	Needs (e.g. desire for significance)

4. Empirical illustrations of the conceptual toolkit

4.1. Overview of case studies

WP5 consists of five country-based case studies across Europe and beyond. These are conducted in selected localities in Turkey, Serbia, Germany, Bosnia and Portugal by WP5 researchers in these countries. For this framework paper, we particularly draw on preliminary analysis of empirical findings from sites in Turkey, Portugal and Germany. The fieldwork analyses presented in the sections that follow are used to illustrate and enrich our proposed conceptual toolkit. As such, the following sections are not intended to be read as complete data analyses. More complete analyses of the data will be presented in the country case studies reports (D5.2) and, along with this framework paper, they will form the basis for developing a methods handbook for the development of dialogical interventions (D5.3) and two strategy briefs (D5.4).

Methodologically, OppAttune calls for researchers to map the field anthropologically, according to each researcher's ethnographic case and approach to "thick description" (Geertz 1973). Accordingly, the case studies of this work package are broadly ethnographic and participatory, using a mix of qualitative methods.

▪ In **Turkey**, the methodology employed was focused and rapid ethnography in three sites using a collaborative and participatory action methodology. Sites were selected as strategic places for "focused ethnography" (Kelly 2022), meaning the goal was not an ethnography of all of Turkey, nor an entire neighbourhood or specific way of life, but an ethnography of a specific set of narratives within a cultural milieu. Further, the ethnography takes the form of "rapid ethnographic assessment" meaning short-term (less than 2 months) intensive research (Sangaramoorthy and Kroeger 2020). However, three strategic sites (Istanbul, Sanliurfa and Hatay) were included meaning that the total time of fieldwork was approximately 6 months. In each site researchers undertook qualitative fieldwork involving observations of narratives (30+ hours) and (10+) interviews in daily life⁶. Comparing three locations adds support and breadth to each site's findings, while ensuring that the findings capture important ethno-national and historical differences that are reflective of the diversity of Turkish society. Researchers in the Turkey site employed participatory action research (PAR), meaning research led by local members of communities and seeking a greater equality between researchers and participants than is traditional. The goal of PAR is to understand the point of view and context of participants, to enable people to think critically about their community, to begin discussing everyday social and political forces and potentially to initiate action (Freire 1973). With regards to the observations captured, these are entirely shaped by the local researchers' sensibilities about what is "hostile" and "dehumanizing" (or the opposite) in their specific local contexts as well as settings and objects highlighted by the interviewees during interviews.

▪ In **Germany**, the methodology is "Narrative Group Work in Schools" (NGW), which has shown to be a useful intervention method in challenging environments of antidemocratic and right-wing extremist views among young people in schools (Weilnböck 2024, 2022a, 2021). The method of narrative group work is, briefly, a lightly structured group conversation with adolescent students, facilitated by two trained practitioners, taking place over the course of one-two semesters for one hour per week. The method is maximally participatory since facilitators refrain from any agenda setting and restrict themselves to providing a safe space for whatever students intend to share while applying techniques of narrative dialogue facilitation, active listening and the basics of dealing with group dynamics. Since narrative dialogue avoids 'why' questions and focusses on 'what' questions, a typical opening question would be "so, how's it going?", "what keeps you busy,

⁶ This methodology will be fully explained in deliverable 5.3, but we can briefly describe here that our approach is emic with the aim of understanding social life from the point of view of our participants and adapted when necessary for each local context. We informed our interviewees that we wished to understand peoples' first-hand experiences with people who have migrated and have different backgrounds, their individual stories, and how their ideas have changed over time. We also asked questions about the earthquake, their daily lives and their goals and hopes for the future.

here at school or beyond?”, or “what would you like to talk about here?”. This method seeks to answer two main research questions: (1) How do socio-emotional and socio-economic factors contribute to students’ developing extremist oppositional attitudes? (2) Which interventions and strategies of (non-formal) education and counselling/social work in and around schools can effectively reduce extremist oppositional drivers and stimulate potentials of democratic personality formation, exploratory behaviour and constructive opposition? NGW was conducted in schools of East Germany. This context was chosen for several reasons. First, while anti-democratic attitudes have become more normalised across the country (Böckler Stiftung, 2024; Zick et al. 2023), the right-wing nationalist party AfD has been shown to be more popular in East Germany especially among young people. This can be at least partially attributed to class and regional inequalities which create fertile ground for grievance politics in the poorer parts of the country and the population.

▪ In **Portugal**, the methodology employed was rapid and focused ethnography and participant observation, profiting from the connection and knowledge of researchers to their geographical milieu. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with random people approached at cafés, restaurants, and other public venues, followed by snowball sampling. The research team conducted 13 interviews, averaging 45-minutes. Respondents were asked to elaborate on their current anxieties and preoccupations followed by more directed questions on the topics of immigration, community relations and their own personal experiences of these. The fieldwork was conducted in small localities of central Portugal where right-wing parties have recently gained traction alongside a discourse of abandonment by the central political power based in Lisbon. This may help explain local people’s support of Chega, a right-wing nationalist party that has gained traction in that region. Arguably, a sense of being in the ‘periphery’ helps make issues of corruption and abuse of office more salient, as state resources are seen to flow to Portuguese larger cities. For these reasons, research in small-medium sized localities has proved fertile on every-day, personal experiences that form narratives about oppositional drivers.

4.2 Istanbul, Sanliurfa and Hatay (Turkey)

In all three places in which we conducted fieldwork, we came across similar narratives about the lesser worth of Syrians, which can be considered automatic speech (narrative that is repeated unreflexively). Three prominent narratives we can outline are:

1. “anti-Arab”;
2. importance placed on militaristic national culture and idea of disloyalty of Syrians; and
3. economic concerns and the idea that Syrians receive too much government charity.

Many of these narratives have already been reported in prior research and explained with

regards to Turkey's political history, ethno-national and religious identities and militarized society (Ozcurumez and Mete 2021; Ozduzen et al. 2021; Saracoglu 2019; Saracolgu and Beranger 2019; Sivis 2022). A major finding of our research is that the local context and the relation to the nation of that local place matters for understanding oppositional narratives, even when the narratives are widely shared. In other words: common sense and widely shared narratives have particular and specific meanings in local places where they are interpreted in relation to the historical and current positioning of that place and its people within the nation.

In Hatay and Sanliurfa, Syrians are absorbed into Arabic-speaking Alevi and Kurdish communities that have faced state oppression, lack of resources and rights. Thus, the presence of Syrians recalls long-term struggles and grievances about control over their place and its migration planning and management. For example, Sunni Syrians who seem to have been invited by the government seem threatening in Hatay, as one interviewee explained,

We think that the government has some agenda – maybe they want to populate Hatay with Syrians and keep the local population as a minority. Hatay is a little fragile because of its history and because some Arab states show Hatay as belonging to Syria on their maps. They question its belonging to Turkey. So, if the Syrian population keeps increasing then they'll choose a Syrian mayor and change the local laws and impose their way of living. So, we will be like foreigners in our own country culturally.

In this narrative, we see that the country-wide discourse that Turkey might become “too Arab” sparks particular fears because of a perceived cultural “fragility” of Hatay due to its ethno-national make-up and history. **Ontological security** fits very well as an explanation for everyday extremist sentiments here – people fear that their home is under threat of annihilation.

Place and culture are not abstract ideas but permeate spaces of interaction. Work, school, neighbourhoods and markets compel people to interact across racial/ethnic lines (Wood and Landry, 2008). Here, the notion of semi-public zones of encounter and **everyday racism** are explanatory. The visual and auditorial perception of Syrians in Istanbul, Sanliurfa and Hatay (i.e. differing dress and using Arabic publicly) prompts an **affective aversive response** that impacts people's sense of order and control over their locality. Complaining about signs in Arabic or complaining about hearing spoken Arabic is common throughout the country, but the situation in Sanliurfa and Hatay has a particular resonance since Arabic and Kurdish are spoken languages there. According to one of our interlocutors, in Sanliurfa, Arabic signs are commonly accepted because of the Muslim religion, but Kurdish signs are not commonly used, reflecting a long history of not allowing Kurdish language and potential legal risks for doing so. Thus, it seems unfair that “**Syrians have their signs while Kurdish shops cannot have theirs.**” In Hatay, an Alawi woman explained, “**I was glad to speak Arabic with Syrians at first, but I didn't like how they came to Hatay and acted like they owned the place, like it was their country**”. Even shared language could not overcome broader fears about power and control based on linguistic dominance in Sanliurfa and sheer numbers of migrants in Hatay. For Syrians, the result of encounters in daily life is a feeling that they are not wanted in public spaces. One of our interviewers (from Sanliurfa) believes that this causes an “internalized everyday extremism”, which means having to hide one's identity. Interviewees told him that they change how they wear their headscarf or do not read Arabic language books on public

transportation so as not to appear Syrian.

Narratives of sympathy for being a refugee or the notion that Syrians are “guests” no longer function to increase acceptance and hospitality (Yitmen et al. 2022). As one interviewee in Istanbul related, “**The time of victimization is done. Now you should be part of the community. You should look around and see how people live here and start to live like them**”. Istanbul is a mega-city that has been absorbing and confronting rural-urban and European migration waves for decades meaning that most people are familiar with everyday migration stories, but this does not automatically lead to empathy. Even in Sanliurfa, people feel that they are becoming minorities overrun by privileged “others.” As one interviewee said, “**Syrians made us like refugees. They are like Israelis. We are like Palestinians**”. In part, this reflects the findings of social psychology and a **group-based social identity perspective**, which suggests that at the core of polarised oppositions lies inter-group antagonism whereby the in-group’s existence relies on the oppression of the ‘othered’ out-group. However, historical experiences matter a lot here. In Turkey, being a minority means being threatened because people do not trust the state to respect the religious and cultural differences of minorities.

Narratives about how to live should be understood in light of the lack of control of public space in the wake of runaway privatization and securitization (Dolek, 2015; Eckardt & Wildner, 2008). In this context, if Syrians are seen in public spaces doing something “socially wrong” (even if it is rather minor and also done by some Turks), it is disturbing. In Hatay, an interviewee tried to explain what bothers her about seeing Syrians in public beaches.

They misuse the public space – it’s not like we are bothered by them picnicking on the beach, but they don’t put their blankets on the sand – they put them on the pavement (jogging/walking path) so we can’t use it for our walks. Many times we couldn’t walk because they’re blocking the way, and that’s annoying. They don’t obey the rules. They don’t adapt. But we’re not afraid of Syrian families in public spaces – they come to play in the playground, that’s ok. But for example, Syrian people eating sunflower seeds and littering, that makes us angry. It’s not like Turkish people don’t do it but when someone else does it in your country it’s more visible.

According to this interviewee, it is not “normal” activities like picnicking and families at the playground that disturbs her, but the minor “wrong” things like a blanket in the wrong place and littered sunflower seeds. These actions are signs of uncivility and lower social class status. Throughout Turkey, Syrians are criticized for their social or cultural backwardness, including for being uneducated villagers, for talking loudly on public transportation, or for staying awake and making noise late at night. For example, sunflower seed litter is a common complaint of middle-class Turks about lower-class Turks (Rottmann, 2013).

However, sometimes criticism of Syrians takes a more serious moralizing tone. One interviewee in Istanbul explained,

I live in Esenler, where there's a significant Syrian refugee population. I don't have issues with other nationalities; my concern is more about behaviour. Being from Kayseri, respect, understanding, and prioritizing women are significant. This is

something I've found lacking among single Syrians. For example, on public transport, many Syrians, especially men, act as if they're the only ones here, not caring if their behaviour bothers others. I've confronted them, but they continue.

In this narrative, values like respect and “prioritizing women” are said to be cause for confrontation, and indeed, when there are violent incidents between Turks and Syrians, “protecting women” is often given as a reason for the violence. Thus, the sense that Syrians do not show respect to cultural values in everyday life causes a simmering **resentful opposition** (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018, 2022) that may erupt at particular moments.

In Hatay, feelings about Syrians are affected by the earthquake due to which people literally lost their homes. For example, during a conversation about tensions between Syrians and local population, we were told that in the last 10 years there were some problems in the neighbourhoods of Iskenderun. But an interviewee claimed this is not the case anymore because the population declined after the earthquake. “We need people to work and live here so no one pays attention to whether or not you’re Syrian or Turkish anymore. People are less particular about the ethnicity”. The idea that “no one pays attention” anymore may be exaggerated. However, we found that the earthquake has a quelling effect on inter-ethnic tensions as the earthquake created its own everyday extremism. By far, but the bigger issue than the Syrians next door for people in Hatay is not having a house, a livelihood or a city - and worse - not knowing if one will ever have these again.

4.3 East Germany

In line with our conceptual toolkit, in the East German case study we have found that institutional-structural factors are particularly important drivers of everyday extremism. This is so especially with regards to structural weaknesses of the school system, as per first sub-section below, and the inadequacy of community services, which is discussed in the second sub-section. Both these issues result from the lack of sufficient resourcing and state support of vital youth provision. The final sub-section illustrates the role of anti-democratic ideologies and intergroup relations, which are anchored in the country’s recent political history and are expressed in the present within personal and family histories through inter-generational transmission. This later point is crucial as it show the complex interplay of levels of analysis, as elaborated in our toolkit: namely, the interaction and interwovenness of the personal/familiar and social/historical.

School system and pedagogical deficiencies

The school system and its everyday pedagogical practice, especially in rural areas and in eastern German states and regions, which are experiencing a high degree of normalization of right-wing populist and extremist attitudes, face several challenges. Many schools are not in a

position and do not have the capacity to deal efficiently and sustainably with the multifaceted phenomena of (cyber) mobbing among their students, accelerated by social media, even if they do not correspond to extremist oppositional ideologies. The infrastructure for social learning, emotional intelligence, media literacy and personal self-reflection of young people is not sufficiently developed in most schools to meet the major challenges of today's beleaguered democracies. In particular, school systems are ill-equipped to deal with youth cultures of right-wing extremism in schools, or youth cultures of any other form of extremist oppositional ideology. Moreover, teacher training, professional supervision and process development among teachers also do not seem to be where they should be. There have been recent media reports about an (exemplary) school in the eastern German state of Brandenburg (in the city of Burg), neighboring Berlin, where two dedicated teachers did not receive sufficient support or assistance when they reported right-wing extremist activities among their students. Part of the challenge seems to have been their colleagues in the school's teaching staff and education policymakers in the relevant ministry. Even after the teachers published an urgent letter to the media as a last resort to raise awareness, the situation has not been resolved since. On the contrary, the two teachers ended up leaving the school after half a year as a result of personal resentment and mobbing against them and insufficient support from the school administration and education policy. Furthermore, many schools have not been sufficiently staffed and equipped to take advantage of and successfully mediate the influx of refugees from African and Middle Eastern countries.

Quality and availability of community services

Many of the cases of extremist oppositional attitudes among adolescents can be traced back to the lived realities of these young people within their families and immediate social contexts. This implies a high demand for youth and family support, often including mental health support, which is not easily met by existing community infrastructures. In particular, mental health care appears to be too pharmaceutical in nature, and resources for psychosocial support for family and relationship issues are not nearly as developed as the existing demand in many places. As a result, high levels of social pressure and unresolved family and relationship tensions and (mental) health problems are often found, leading to higher levels of aggressive behavior and extremist oppositional attitudes. The growing infrastructure of school social work is a step in the right direction, also the increasing awareness of education policy makers. However, resources are still scarce, and a lot of awareness-raising and infrastructure building remains to be done. All in all, the municipal services of child and youth care, family support and (mental) health care are often not sufficient to adequately support families that are under economic and psychological pressure and have few resources of their own in terms of socio-emotional resilience. All of these factors must be seen in the context of rapidly increasing social and economic injustice, both in terms of class and geographic region. Not to be underestimated, especially in East Germany, is the influx of drugs from Eastern Europe combined with a certain degree of generally accepted alcoholism among the population.

Transgenerational transmission of anti-democratic and resentful attitudes

A major driving force of extremist oppositional thought and behavior in Germany is the long legacy of violence, anti-democratic attitudes, and racism that has been culturally transmitted through “transgenerational transmission” in families, neighbourhoods, communities, and regions. Some of the students who exhibit outright neo-Nazi attitudes and activities or high levels of **group focused enmity** have been shown to draw directly on a regional history of right-wing extremist comradeships in the 1990s and 2000s, in which their parents were involved, themselves continuing the effects of the authoritarian GDR regime in pre-1989 East Germany, which also frequently goes back to the experiences and actions of World War II. This legacy of post-perpetrator/post-traumatic group focused enmity goes back several generations to the time of the World Wars, including the post-war invasion of the Soviet army into East Germany and the subsequent authoritarian GDR regime. Future analysis of data from our East German case study will provide more insight into the role of transgenerational processes, adding a genealogical perspective to OppAttune’s transnational emphasis.

4.4 Central Portugal

(Perceived) corruption

Research in Portugal demonstrates the multidimensionality of extremism and extremist discourse, and the articulation and influence of different opposition drivers across levels and domains. Corruption is a highly salient subject in Portuguese society and a top concern of Portuguese citizens (RTP, 2023). The country ranked 34^o in Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index” in 2023, and surveys on perception and attitudes towards corruption place it at the forefront of EU member states, well above average. According to a Eurobarometer poll, 93% of Portuguese respondents considered corruption a “common phenomenon” in Portugal, well above EU average (26%), even if the percentage of respondents that were victims or witnessed acts of corruption was marginally lower (Eurobarometer, 2023). Briefly, the country ranks high in perceptions about how widespread corruption is, as well as its impact in respondents’ lives (European Commission, 2023).

Portuguese politics has been turmoiled by corruption scandals and judicial investigations throughout the last decade. However, many of the investigations launched by the public attorneys have been either closed, they have been embroiled in endlessly pre-trial court battles or ended up with no convictions. In October 2023, the Office of the General Attorney of the Republic issued a statement declaring that former and current ministers and high-level government staff were under judicial investigation for corruption charges. The declaration mentioned that the Supreme Court was assessing the role of the PM, António Costa, caught in the wiretap recordings, which prompt his resignation. Our first interviews were conducted in the period between the Parliament’s dissolution and the legislative elections, amidst an electoral campaign. The elections held in March saw right-wing parties winning a majority in

the national assembly, where the far-right populist party Chega more than quadrupled its seats, from 12 to 50 (out of 230). This result has so far completely upset the traditional bi-partisan workings and mechanisms of the political system. Chega's electoral campaign was based on a populist anti-corruption narrative, catering to specific groups' grievances (namely wage demands by security forces). The party's slogan was "To Clean Portugal".

Far-right **populist political discourse** on corruption makes use of an us/them dichotomy, depicting corrupt or self-serving political elites against "the people" (Curini, 2018, p. 160; Mendilow, 2021, pp. 12–13; Rohac et al., 2017, p. 382; Ziller & Schübel, 2015, pp. 1–2). Our findings reproduce discourse and narratives broadly in line with populist rhetoric and ideology. Several respondents represented the "political class", "politicians" or "political elites" as social groups which act primarily on behalf of their own interests, which are manifestly opposed to those of the common citizenry. Against a representative view of politics, the vast majority argued that politicians act essentially in self-serving ways: "they look only for themselves"; "this is what they want"; "they don't care about us". This reproduces prototypical right-wing populist narratives (Shawn, 2023, pp. 3-4). The dualistic and us/them discursive frameworks of populism are present in the discourse of Chega, in the words of its charismatic leader André Ventura, who deploys an elite-people dichotomy and the irreconcilable opposition between his party and the people against the powerful ruling elites (Pimenta et al., 2022, pp. 9–11). When asked about which values, skills or character a good PM should bear, a large majority of respondents referred to traditional or conservative themes, such as respect for tradition and authority (e.g., familial, school and institutional authority), while others spoke mostly of humanist values (respect for difference; equality of opportunities).

Individuals reported **disillusionment, anxiety, anger and feelings of powerlessness** as key sentiments driving their attitudes towards the upcoming 2024 legislative election. We interpret these to be a manifestation of *ressentiment* as conceptualized by Capelos and Demertzis (2022, p. 108). Several participants, despite stressing their distance from Chega, declared that "[André] Ventura says what we all think", while a large majority assumed the political leader "[does] say some truths". The backlash of resentment is also underscored by the solutions put forward by our study participants. Some referred the need for a paternalistic personality, sometimes in clear reference to Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, the long-term dictator from the pre-democratic period, often depicted as a model despite his politics. Briefly, Portugal is represented as needing a political leader who cares about the people and places public service and interest above petty politics. This leader is personified in the image of populist leaders such as André Ventura.

Intersecting material and immigration grievances

Although material conditions do not play a direct and straight effect in extremism and radicalization processes, they do influence them. Inequality and corruption play a major role in the opinions of those interviewed. Limited access to and poor health and public services were one of the major grievances advanced by almost all. They attributed lack of investment in health services to poor policy choices, explained by the prioritization of what they consider to be the interests of the governing elites against the needs of the people. Some have also attributed the

status quo to powerful economic and corporative interests, including the existence of public-private partnerships and the not always legitimate demands of the medical community. In these narratives the us/them binomial fits with right-wing populist discourses that present the people vs. the elites. This interpretation is consistent with the narrative advanced by Chega (Batista, 2022, p. 45).

The issue of inflation and rising housing prices was also a major concern. Once more, the brunt of responsibility falls on the shoulders of politicians. Incompetence, rather than corruption, was the main explanation for the lack of measures to address these problems. However, the majority of respondents struggled to articulate who specifically was behind them and how these problems arose. Their discourses resorted to anecdotal, every-day interactions and examples to expound their grievances. Material conditions were also articulated through narratives that divided those who contribute from those that live off the labor of others. These examples focused on individuals or groups that are perceived to live off social security programs and that do not contribute to the rest of society. Although those that we talked to did not directly identify these groups with the Roma community, some did hint at that. This is another major trope deployed by the Chega party (Galhardas, 2023, pp. 77–78; Gonçalves, 2023, p. 18).

Finally, material grievances are also articulated alongside migration concerns, but these do not take the form of xenophobia as such, but they are expressed through concerns and grievances over the allocation state resources. The constant flow of young, graduate workers that move abroad was a strong concern of our respondents. However, oppositional drivers appear especially in relation to migrants moving to Portugal. Overall, our interviewees espoused, at the face of it, a favorable opinion of migrants, almost all of them referring the important Portuguese historical waves of migration. Attitudes towards migrants do not differ from those towards the majority of the population, except for individuals that unequivocally adhered and adopted right-wing extremist positions. We suggest that hostility towards migrants, a novel trend which is successfully normalised by far-right populist discourses, cannot be fully explained in terms of xenophobia. We have found that the concept of **welfare chauvinism** helps to explain our findings. To explain, in our data Portuguese nationals demanded that migrants fulfil two major duties: first, that they respect societal values and the Portuguese culture; secondly, that they become productive members of society, without ‘burdening’ social security and public services. These are both lines of argument taken by right-wing Portuguese populists (Gonçalves, 2023, p. 6) and constitute, as we explained in section 2.4, a form of welfare chauvinism (Bell et al., 2023, p. 302). In general terms, respondents were broadly receptive to the cultural and religious practices of migrant communities and groups. However, we hypothesize that this might be a function of the geographical territory where these interviews were conducted: aged mainland territories with declining population rates. The us/them divide across nationalities mirror broader moral and value considerations in society and their impact of economic conditions.

4.4 Summary

This concluding section presents a selective summary of findings from the three case studies brings together the theoretical and empirical observations of the previous sections to illustrate the complex interplay of opposition drivers.

In the Turkish case study, the anti-Arab narratives found in local sites constitute part of everyday ‘common-sense’. As was shown in section 3.2 these cultural narratives are intimately intertwined with Turkish and Arab identities in the context of contemporary Turkey as well as historically (i.e. relations between Turkey and Arab nations in the region). At an affective level, intergroup relations between Arab minorities and Turkish majority are concretized through embodied affective responses, such as feelings of aversion towards perceived cultural difference. Feelings of ontological insecurity on the part of Kurds, a historically more present minority in Turkey, and a sense of grievance against Syrians also play out in the material physical space of the local environment (e.g. quote by a Kurdish participant that “**Syrians have their signs while Kurdish shops cannot have theirs.**”). We see here, in short, an intersection of inequality and racialization within a complex web of social relations between minoritized and majority groups, which is material and embodied as well as symbolic and historical.

The East German case study sheds more light on the intersection between symbolic, cultural narratives, on the one hand, and lack of material resources, on the other hand. The case study shows that the inadequacy of state support in East German schools, alongside the poor quality of community services in these areas, create fertile ground for right-wing nationalist parties like the AfD, which builds on feelings of resentment to mobilise group-focused enmity against minorities. Notably, in the East German context, resentful attitudes towards minoritized ‘others’ are not only a matter of contemporary politics, but they are also anchored on a regional historical repertoire of authoritarian politics going back several generations.

The case study of Portugal highlights the interconnections between politics and material inequalities in a similar way to East Germany – illustrating international patterns in the emergence of opposition drivers. The Portuguese case study was conducted in small localities of Central Portugal, where right-wing parties, including the ultra-nationalist party, Chega, are more popular. The study showed how Chega’s far-right populist political discourse on corruption is successful in building an us/them opposition, wrapped in a narrative of ‘ordinary people’ seen as having been chronically left behind by the (perceived as) corrupt elite political establishment based in Lisbon. Here, in other words, there is an intersection between ‘real’, material inequalities and lack of support. These grievances are successfully mobilized by populist leaders within an anti-immigration political project, anchored on a nativist ideology. Disillusionment, anxiety, anger and feelings of powerlessness provide an affective texture to these experiences and contribute to the construction of a sense of crisis and ontological insecurity.

Our preliminary analyses of diverse case studies across local ecologies in Europe highlights the discrepancy between the neatness of analytic levels and disciplinary boundaries, on the one hand, and the ‘messy’ realities of opposition drivers in our everyday encounters with others. Adding to this, we suggest that what drives polarization is a set of multi-level drivers operating across domains: subjective, social, cultural, political, historical and material. Ethnographic work is essential for uncovering the local nuances of the emergence of opposition drivers. Our proposed framework offers an integrated, *generally applicable and locally sensitive* conceptual toolkit for the emergence of opposition drivers.

References

- Abou-Chadi, T., Cohen, D. & Wagner, M. (2021). The centre-right versus the radical right: the role of migration issues and economic grievances. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 48(2), 366-384.
- Allport, G.W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Garden City, NY, Doubleday.
- Altemeyer, R. (1981). *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. University of Manitoba Press.
- Andersen, J. & Bjørklund, T. (1990). Structural changes and new cleavages: the progress parties in Denmark and Norway. *Acta Sociologica*, 33(3), 195-217.
- Attewell, D. (2020). Deservingness perceptions, welfare state support and vote choice in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 44(3), 611-634.
- Bandura, A. (1986). *Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. *Journal of Moral Education*, 31(2), 101–119.
- Bandura, A. (2015). *Moral disengagement: How people do harm and live with themselves*. New York: Worth Publishers.
- Batista, A. R. B. (2022). *Populismo contemporâneo português: O Chega e a Comunicação Política* [Dissertação de Mestrado]. Universidade do Minho.
- Bell, D. A., Valenta, M., & Strabac, Z. (2023). Perceptions and realities: Explaining welfare chauvinism in Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 33(3), 301–316. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287231158019>
- Berger, J. M. (2017). Extremist Construction of Identity: How Escalating Demands for Legitimacy Shape and Define In-Group and Out-Group Dynamics. *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29402>
- Blee, K. M. (2002). *Inside organized racism: Women in the hate movement*. University of California Press.
- Blee, K. M. (2007). Women in the 1920s Ku Klux Klan movement. In B. Perry (Ed.), *Women in public and private life* (pp. 135-154). Ohio University Press.
- Blee, K., & Linden, A. (2012). Women in extreme right parties and movements: A comparison of the Netherlands and the United States. In K. M. Blee & S. McGee Deutsch (Eds), *Women of the right: Comparisons and interplay across borders* (pp. 98–114). University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Billg, M. (1988). The notion of ‘prejudice’: Some rhetorical and ideological aspects. *Text - Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse*, 8(1-2), 1988, 91-110. <https://doi.org/10.1515/text.1.1988.8.1-2.91>
- Boas, F. (1914). Mythology and Folk-Tales of the North American Indians. *Journal of American Folklore*, 27(106), 374–410.

- Bourabain, D. & Verhaeghe, P.-P. (2021). Everyday racism in social science research: A systematic review and future directions. *Du Bois Review*, 18(2), 221–250.
- Bradby, H. (2017). Taking story seriously. *Social Theory & Health* Vol. 15, 2, 206–222
- Brown, W. (2019). In *the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West*. Columbia University Press
- Brubaker, R. (2017). Why populism? *Theory and Society*, 46(5), 357–385
- Bruner, J. (1986). *Actual minds, possible worlds*. Harvard University Press.
- Bruner, J. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, D. (2013). Poststructuralism. in T. Dunne et. al (Eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 223–246. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Capelos, T., & Demertzis, N. (2022). Sour grapes: *Ressentiment* as the affective response of grievance politics. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 35(1), 107–129. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2021.2023005>
- Capelos, T., & Demertzis, N. (2018). Political Action and Resentful Affectivity in Critical Times. *Humanity & Society*, 1-24. doi:10.1177/0160597618802517.
- Capelos, T., & A. Katsanidou. (2018). Reactionary Politics: Explaining the Psychological Roots of Anti Preferences in European Integration and Immigration Debates. *Political Psychology*, 39(9), 271–1288.
- Careja, R. & Harris, R. (2022). Thirty years of welfare chauvinism research: findings and challenges. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 32(2), 212-224.
- Croft, S. (2012). Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of Britain’s Muslims. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33(2), 219-235.
- Cropp C. Die psychoanalytisch-interaktionelle Methode (PIM): Ein psychodynamischer Behandlungsansatz für Jugendliche mit schweren strukturellen Störungen [The Psychoanalytic-interactive Method (PIM): A Psychodynamic Treatment for Adolescents with Severe Disorders of Personality Functioning]. *Prax Kinderpsychol Kinderpsychiatr*. 2017 Jul;66(6):435-444. German. doi: 10.13109/prkk.2017.66.6.435. PMID: 28701097.
- Cruz Santos, C., Reis Luz, H, Nunes, V., Ricarte, J. (2022). Portugal between Crises: Justice and Deservingness in the Current Social Protection System. In *Direitos Económicos, Sociais e Culturais: Vinculação e (re)construções no Século XXI* (pp. 73-86), DOI:[10.51389/MYFP8361](https://doi.org/10.51389/MYFP8361).
- Curini, L. (2018). *Corruption, Ideology, and Populism*. Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56735-8r>
- Dant, T. (2006). Material civilization: Things and society. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57(2), 289–308.
- D’Angelo, A. (2023). “Migration Policy and Welfare Chauvinism in the United Kingdom: European Divergence or Trend-Setting?” In Finotelli, C., Ponzio, I. (eds.) *Migration Control Logics and Strategies in Europe*. IMISCOE Research Series (pp, 229-245). Springer.

- De Cleen, B. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2017) Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism. *Javnost - The Public*, 24(4), 301-319, DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2017.1330083.
- De Vries, C. E. & Hobolt, S. B. (2020). *Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe*. Princeton University Press.
- Dixon, J. (2017). ‘Thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant?’ Transcending the accuracy–inaccuracy dualism in prejudice and stereotyping research. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 56 (1), 4-27.
- Dovidio, J. F. (2001). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The third wave. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57(4), 829–849. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00244>.
- Dovidio, J. F. & Gaertner, S. L. (2004). Aversive racism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 36.
- Edwards, D. & Potter, J. (1992). *Discursive psychology*. Sage.
- Eurobarometer. (2023). *Atitudes dos cidadãos relativamente à corrupção na UE em 2023* (Eurobarómetro Especial 534). European Commission.
- European Commission. (2023). *Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023: April-May 2023* (534; Special Eurobarometer, p. 100). European Commission.
- Fierke, K. (2007). *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Polity.
- Fischer-Nebmaier, V. (2015). “Introduction: Space, narration and the everyday.” In V. Fischer-Nebmaier, M. P. Berg, & A. Christou (Eds.), *Narrating the city: Histories, space and the everyday* (pp. 1–57). Berghahn Books.
- Flinders, M. & Hinterleitner, M. (2022). Party Politics vs. Grievance Politics: Competing Modes of Representative Democracy. *Society*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-022-00686-z>.
- Franc, R. & Pavlović, T. (2023). Inequality and radicalisation: systematic review of quantitative studies. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 35(4), 785-810.
- Galhardas, R. A. (2023). *Populismo e a segregação das comunidades ciganas em Portugal: O caso mediático do Chega!* [Dissertação de Mestrado]. Lisboa: Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity*. Polity Press.
- Gilbert, G. (2015). The Long 90s is Over. Available at <https://jeremygilbertwriting.wordpress.com/2015/09/14/the-long-90s-is-over/> (1/05/2024).
- Glaser, E. (2018). *Anti-Politics: On the Demonization of Ideology, Authority and the State*. Repeater.
- Gillespie, A. (2008). Social Representations, Alternative Representations and Semantic Barriers. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 38(4). 375-391.
- Gillespie, A. (2020a). Disruption, Self-Presentation, and Defensive Tactics at the Threshold of Learning. *Review of General Psychology* 24(4), 382-396.
- Gillespie, A. (2020b). Semantic contact and semantic barriers: reactionary responses to disruptive ideas. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 35, 21–25.

- Gonçalves, A. R. (2023). *Populism and Social Policies: A study about CHEGA's Party positions on Social Policy* [Dissertação de Mestrado]. ISCTE.
- Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., Duan, L., Almaliach, A., Ang, S., Arnadottir, J., Aycan, Z., Boehnke, K., Boski, P., Cabecinhas, R., Chan, D., Chhokar, J., D'Amato, A., Ferrer, M., Fischlmayr, I. C., ... Yamaguchi, S. (2013). Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. *Science*, 332(6033), 1100–1104. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1197754>
- Gotsch, K., & Palmberger, M. (2022). The Nexus of Anthropology and Narrative: Ethnographic Encounters with Storytelling Practices. *Narrative Culture* 9(1) Spring, pp. 1-22.
- Habermas, J. (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Beacon.
- Habermas, J. (1987). *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume II: System and Lifeworld: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*. Beacon.
- Halverson, J., Corman, S., & Goodall, H. L. (2011). Master narratives of Islamist extremism. Springer.
- Harris, A. (2013). *Young People and Everyday Multiculturalism*. Routledge.
- Haslam, S. A. & Reicher, S. D. (2016). Rethinking the Psychology of Leadership: From Personal Identity to Social Identity. *Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences*. doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00394.
- Hogg, M. A., & Adelman, J. (2013). Uncertainty–Identity Theory: Extreme Groups, Radical Behavior, and Authoritarian Leadership. *Journal of Social Issues*, 69(3), 436–454.
- Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. *HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026*. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659>.
- Jovchelovitch, S. (2007). *Knowledge in context: Representations, community, and culture*. Routledge.
- Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security. *Political Psychology*, 25(5), 741-767.
- Kinnvall, C.; Manners, I.; Mitzen, J. (2018). Ontological (in)security in the European Union. *European Security*, 27(3), 249.265.
- Kinnvall, K. & Capelos, T. (2021). The Psychology of Extremist Identification. *European Psychologist*, 26(1), 1-5. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000439>
- Köttig, M. & Blum, A. (2018): Social Work and Right-Wing Extremism in Germany – Reflections on Biographical Involvement. *Journal of Human Rights and Social Work*, Vo. 3, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-018-0067-2>
- Köttig, M. (2013). Familiäre Ursachenkonstellationen rechtsextremer Handlungs- und Orientierungsmuster junger Frauen. In: *Familiendynamik. Systemische Praxis und Forschung*, 38. Jg., H. 2, S. 138-150. <https://www.frankfurt-university.de/de/hochschule/fachbereich-4-soziale-arbeit-gesundheit/kontakt/professor-innen/michaela-kottig/>

- Kroeber, A. L., & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions. *Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology*, 47(1), 3–222.
- Kros, M. & Coenders, M. (2019). Explaining differences in welfare chauvinism between and within individuals over time: the role of subjective and objective economic risk, economic egalitarianism, and ethnic threat. *European Sociological Review*, 35(6), 860-873.
- Kruglanski, A. W. (2004). *The psychology of closed mindedness*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Krzyżanowski, M., Wodak, R., Bradby, H., Gardell, M., Kallis, A., Krzyżanowska, N., Mudde, C., & Rydgren, J. (2023). Discourses and practices of the ‘New Normal’ Towards an interdisciplinary research agenda on crisis and the normalization of anti- and post-democratic action. *Journal of Language and Politics*.
- Laclau, E. (2005). *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Laing, R. D. (1960). *The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness*. Penguin.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1848). *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. Marxists Internet Archive. Accessed on 09/05/2024, available at <https://www.marxists.org/admin/books/manifesto/Manifesto.pdf>
- Mazzarella, W. 2019. The Anthropology of Populism: Beyond the Liberal Settlement. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 48:45–60
- McCluskey, E. (2019). *From Righteousness to Far Right: An Anthropological Rethinking of Critical Security Studies*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- Mendilow, J. (2021). Introduction to Populism and Corruption. In J. Mendilow & É. Phélippeau (Eds.), *Populism and Corruption*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Molinario, E. Katarzyna Jasko, David Webber, and Arie W. Kruglanski. 2021. “The Social Psychology of Violent Extremism.” In: *The Psychology of Extremism*. Edited by Arie W. Kruglanski. London: Routledge.
- Moffitt, B. (2015). How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism. *Government and Opposition*, 50(2), 189–217. doi: 10.1017/gov.2014.13.
- Moscovici, S. (2008). *Psychoanalysis: Its image and its public*. Wiley.
- Mouffe, C. (2013). *On the Political*. Routledge.
- Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541 – 563. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x>.
- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2013). Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government and Opposition*, 48(2), 147-174. <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2012.11>.
- Neal, S., Bennett, K., Cochrane, A., & Mohan, G. (2017). *Lived Experiences of Multiculture: The New Social and Spatial Relations of Diversity*. Routledge.
- Nelson, L. A., & Braff, J. (2020). “Introduction to Anthropology.” In: *PERSPECTIVES: AN OPEN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY* Edited by: Nina Brown, Thomas McIlwraith, Laura Tubelle de González. American Anthropological Association Press.

- Neveu, C. (2015). Of ordinariness and citizenship processes. *Citizenship Studies*, 19(2), 141–154. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2015.1005944>
- Ochs, E., & Capps, L. (1996). Narrating the self. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 25(1), 19–43.
- Pasieka, A. 2019. Anthropology of the far right. What if we like the ‘unlikeable’ others? *Anthropology Today* 35(1).
- Pasieka, A.M. 2021 Postsocialist and Postcapitalist Questions? Far-Right Historical Narratives and the Making of a New Europe. *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 35(4): 975–995.
- Pasieka, A.M. 2022. Are We All Extremists Now? In *Extremism, Society and the State*. Editor: Loperfido, G. London: Berghahn.
- Piaget, J. (1952). *The origins of intelligence in children*. (M. Cook, Trans.). W W Norton & Co. <https://doi.org/10.1037/11494-000>
- Pilkington, H. 2021. Why Should We Care What Extremists Think? The Contribution of Emic Perspectives to Understanding the “right-wing extremist” Mind-Set. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 1–29.
- Pilkington, H. (2017). “EDL Angels stand beside their men ... not behind them”: The politics of gender and sexuality in an anti-Islam(ist) movement. *Gender and Education*, 29(2), 238–257.
- Pilkington, Hilary. 2014. “‘My whole life is here’: Tracing journeys through ‘skinhead.’” In *Youth Cultures in the Age of Global Media*, edited by D. Buckingham, S. Bragg, and M. J. Kehily, 71–87. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pilkington, H. 2016. *Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Pilkington, H., E. Omel’chenko and A. Garifzianova, A. 2010. *Russia’s Skinheads: Exploring and rethinking subcultural lives*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Pimenta, D., Gonçalves, E., & Zúquete, J. P. (2022). *The Irregular Populist: André Ventura—The Leader of Chega*. Team Populism. https://repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/55196/1/ICS_%20JPZuquete_Outreach_The%20Irregular%20Populist%20Andr%c3%a9%20Ventura.pdf
- Reicher, S. (2004). The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance, and Change. *Political Psychology*, 25(6), 921-945.
- Ricoeur, P. (2004). *Memory, history, forgetting*. University of Chicago Press.
- RAN. 2020. *Breaking the cycle*. Radicalisation Awareness Network Policy Brief. Available here: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-01/policy_brief_breaking_the_cycle_122019_en.pdf. Retrieved 28 February 2024.
- Ranstorp, M., 2016. The root causes of violent extremism, RAN Issue Paper. Radicalisation Awareness Network, Available here: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf Retrieved 16 February 2024.

- Reicher, S. & Haslam, S. A. (2016). The Politics of Hope: Donald Trump as an Entrepreneur of Identity. *Scientific American*. Available at <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-politics-of-hope-donald-trump-as-an-entrepreneur-of-identity/> (1/05/2024).
- Ricarte, J. (2023). The Impact of Protracted Peace Processes on Identities in Conflict, *Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16567-2_3
- Rohac, D., Kumar, S., & Johansson Heinö, A. (2017). The wisdom of demagogues: Institutions, corruption and support for authoritarian populists. *Economic Affairs*, 37(3), 382–396. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12264>
- Rovamo, H., & Sakki, I. (2023). Lay representations of populism: Discursive negotiation of naturalized social representation. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*. DOI: 10.1002/casp.2755.
- RTP. (2023, July 19). *Sondagem. País pior do que há um ano é o diagnóstico da maioria*. Sondagem. País pior do que há um ano é o diagnóstico da maioria. https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/politica/sondagem-pais-pior-do-que-ha-um-ano-e-o-diagnostico-da-maioria_n1500691
- Sammut, G., Andreouli, E., Gaskell, G. & Valsiner, J. (2015). *The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Schweder, R. (1991). *Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology*. Harvard University Press.
- Schweppe, J., & Perry, B. (2021). A continuum of hate: Delimiting the field of hate studies. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 77(5), 1–26.
- Scott, J. C. (1990). *Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts*. Yale University Press.
- Shawn, R. (2023). *Democracy Devouring Itself: The Rise of the Incompetent Citizen and the Appeal of Right Wing Populism*. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8806z01m>
- Schafer, Roy (1980). Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue. *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1), 29-53.
- Schouten, P. & Mayer, M. (2017). Materiality in X. Guillaume & P. Bilgin (Eds.) *Routledge handbook of international political sociology*. London: Routledge.
- Shoshan, N. (2016). *The Management of Hate: Nation, Affect, and the Governance of Right-Wing Extremism in Germany*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sidanius, J. & F Pratto, F. (2001). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. Cambridge University Press.
- Somers, M. R., & Gibson, G. D. (1993). Reclaiming the epistemological “other”: Narrative and the social constitution of identity. *Social Research*, 60(4), 1049–1078.
- Sulliva, G. B. (2015). Collective emotions. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 9/8, 383–393, 10.1111/spc3.12183.
- Staerklé, C., Cavallaro, M., & Cortijos-Bernabeu, A. (2023). The Inner Logic: An Intergroup Approach to the Populist Mentality in Europe. In Sensales, G. (Ed.) *The different faces of populism. Interpretations in Political Psychology*. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Stavrakakis, Y., Katsambekis, G., Kiouпкиolis, A., Nikisianis, N., & Siomos, T. (2017). Populism, anti-populism and crisis. *Contemporary Political Theory*. doi:10.1057/s41296-017-0142-y.
- Tajfel, H. (1970). Aspects of national and ethnic loyalty. *Social Science Information*, 9, 119-144.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *The psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Teitelbaum, B. (2017). *Lions of the North: Sounds of the new Nordic radical nationalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Thorleifsson, C. 2020. *Nationalist Responses to the Crises in Europe: Old and New Hatreds*. London: Routledge.
- Totschnig, W. (2016). What is an Event? Probing the Ordinary/Extraordinary Distinction in Recent European Philosophy. *Constellations* 24(1). DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12204
- Vidra, Z. & Zeller, M. (2020). The role of socio-economic inequalities in polarisation and violent extremism. *Deliverable 7.1. Discussion paper*. H2020 Project BRaVE. Available at: http://brave-h2020.eu/repository/D7.1._Discussion_Paper_May_2020.pdf
- Webster, D.M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual Differences in Need for Cognitive Closure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1994, Vol. 67, No. 6, 1049-1062.
- Weilnböck, Harald (2024): “From Holocaust Denial to a Personal Family Tableau: ‘Narrative Group Work’ – How to apply Group Analysis in Schools to Support Democratic Skills Europe-wide. In: Katrin Stumptner (Ed.): *Group Analysis and Psychodynamic Group Therapy with Children and Adolescents - Creative, Innovative and Practical Inspiration*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau. In Print.
- English journal short version in: “The Psychologist”: “How to Acquire the Skills of Being Political in Divisive Times” (May 2024).
 - German book version (2021): Von der Holocaust-Leugnung zum persönlichen Familientableau – Kleine Verlaufsvignette zu zwei Sitzungen von Narrativen Gesprächsgruppen an Schulen. In: *Gruppenanalytisch arbeiten mit Kindern und Jugendlichen. Impulse für eine kreative und vielfältige Praxis?* Hg. von Katrin Stumptner, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2021, S. 96-109. Also: <https://www.cultures-interactive.de/en/articles.html>)
- Weilnböck, Harald (2022): Sieben Thesen zur Notwendigkeit intensivpädagogischer politischer Jugendbildung. Themenpapier für die Tagung "Nur noch kurz die politische Bildung retten ...!?" im Haus am Maiberg 2022, in print, also <https://www.cultures-interactive.de/en/articles.html>
- Weilnböck, Harald (2020a): Rekonstruktive Fallbeschreibung des Verlaufs der Gruppensitzungen der „Alpha“-Gruppe – Phänomene und Bearbeitung von Herrschafts- und Verhinderungsdynamiken sowie von Rechtsextremismus unter Schüler*innen einer neunten Klasse.
- Weilnböck, Harald (2020b): How prevention of right-wing extremism in Europe goes wrong. Why is inter-agency cooperation between government and civil society failing in Europe’s policy making, for the prevention of violent extremism? (Blog)

<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/global-extremes/how-prevention-right-wing-extremism-europe-goes-wrong/>

Wetherell, M. (2015). Trends in the Turn to Affect: A Social Psychological Critique. *Body & Society*, 21(2), 139-166.

Wetherell, M., & Potter, J. (1992). *Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation*. London and New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf and Columbia University Press.

Wodak, R. (2021). *The politics of fear: The shameless normalization of far-right discourse*. 2nd edn. London: Sage.

Wise A., & Velayutham, S. (2009). *Everyday Multiculturalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zick, A., Küpper, B., & Mokros, N. (2023). Die distanzierte Mitte. Rechtsextreme und demokratiegefährdende Einstellungen in Deutschland 2022/23. Hg. für die Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung v. Franziska Schröter

Ziller, C., & Schübel, T. (2015). “The Pure People” versus “the Corrupt Elite”? Political Corruption, Political Trust and the Success of Radical Right Parties in Europe. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 25(3), 368–386.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2014.1002792>

